Asian Philosophy

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Marx and Laozi: A Dialectical Synthesis by James ChambersReza Adeputra Tohis (bio)Marx and Laozi: A Dialectical Synthesis. By James Chambers. Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2023. Pp. xvii + 449, Hardcover €129.99, ISBN 978-3-031-40980-6.James Chambers’s Marx and Laozi: A Dialectical Synthesis (hereafter Marx and Laozi) attempts to connect the thoughts of Karl Marx, the philosopher and socialist revolutionary, with Laozi, the legendary founding figure of Daoism. Although they come from (...) vastly different cultural and philosophical backgrounds, in Marx and Laozi Chambers seeks to demonstrate that there is a dialectical synthesis between Marx’s materialist thought and Laozi’s aesthetic philosophy. The author’s primary aim is to explore the possibility of establishing a constructive dialogue between these two distinct traditions of thought. While acknowledging that the main challenge of his endeavor lies in the fundamental differences between Marx’s materialist perspective on social life and Laozi’s aesthetic approach to personal harmony, Chambers suggests that these seemingly unrelated views can actually complement each other, arguing that a dialectical approach can indeed render these differences complementary, leading to a more comprehensive perspective on philosophical and social issues. This approach positions Laozi as a “philosopher-artist,” complementing Marx’s role as a “philosopher-scientist.”Chambers employs a methodology that involves analyzing key texts from Marx and Laozi’s Daodejing through a dialectical lens. The author also uses this hermeneutical approach to find common ground between the key concepts of these two thinkers, such as dialectical materialism in Marx’s philosophy and Dao in Laozi’s teachings. Chambers does not fail to highlight the importance of understanding the historical and cultural contexts of each philosopher to uncover deeper meanings in their works.Marx and Laozi is divided into thirteen chapters, each exploring different aspects of Marx’s and Laozi’s thought. The Introduction provides an essential foundation for understanding the author’s approach to reading and interpreting three major thinkers: Hegel, Marx, and Laozi. Chambers emphasizes the need for readers to recognize that Marx and Laozi have very different characteristics in their methodologies and philosophical aims. Marx, with his dialectical materialist approach, focuses on history and social change through class struggle. In contrast, Laozi focuses on personal harmony and offers a more comprehensive [End Page 1] philosophical outlook encompassing concepts such as Dao and Wu Wei (non-action). Hegel is introduced as a crucial mediator in the dialogue between Marx and Laozi. Chambers argues that without understanding how Hegel views the world through idealism, it is difficult to fully appreciate how Marx developed his scientific materialism as a response to Hegel’s idealism. Here, Hegel serves as both an antagonist and a foundation for the subsequent development of Marx’s thought (pp. 3–22).Chapter 2, titled “Hegel’s Idealism,” further explores how Hegel developed his concept of idealism, particularly how this idealism relates to change and the fear of change. Chambers investigates how Hegel views the finite and infinite as interrelated concepts in a type of dialectics. This discussion is crucial to explaining how Marx adopted some of Hegel’s concepts, altering them to support his own more materialist views. The author also discusses how Hegel’s interpretation of reality is often misunderstood as mentalistic, while in fact Hegel perceives reality as dialectical, where what is real is a synthesis resulting from the dialectical interaction between idea and matter. This point is significant for understanding Marx’s subsequent critiques and revisions of dialectics within his materialist framework, where matter is considered more primary than ideas (pp. 49–69).Chapter 3, “Hegel’s Confrontation with Laozi,” critiques Hegel’s interpretation of Laozi, arguing that Hegel failed to capture the essence of Dao and Wu Wei. This is hardly surprising within the context of Western philosophy, especially considering that it is heavily centered on logic and abstract categories, and thus cannot easily accommodate notions such as Dao and Wu Wei. Hegel regarded Laozi as a figure trapped in unstructured mysticism, whereas, according to Chambers, Laozi actually offers a rich approach to understanding the cosmos and the role of individuals within it. This section is also critical towards what the author takes to be Hegel’s Eurocentric... (shrink)

A widespread view denies that there is a concept of the sublime in Chinese thought and philosophical aesthetics. This denial is a mistake. We examine texts and artworks that indicate that the experience of the sublime can be found in Chinese aesthetics and theories of art and aesthetic experience. To show this, we first present an overview of the sublime extracted from western writers: we describe the sublime experience’s structure, objects, and status as a mixed (but ultimately pleasant) experience. These (...) themes are then taken as a guide for the analysis of Chinese terms relating to the sublime (such as chónggāo 崇高). We then examine Chinese sources from both the classical and late modern periods. Moreover, we respond to two objections. We conclude that the sublime is not confined to western or European experiences or to movements within those traditions, such as Romanticism. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Taoism, Teaching, and Learning: A Nature-Based Approach to Education by John P. Miller, with Xiang Li and Tian RuanJing Dang (bio)Taoism, Teaching, and Learning: A Nature-Based Approach to Education. By John P. Miller, with Xiang Li and Tian Ruan. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2022. Pp. 134, Paperback $29.95, ISBN 978-1-4875-4095-1.John Miller’s Taoism, Teaching, and Learning: A Nature-Based Approach to Education (hereafter Taoism, Teaching, and Learning) develops a (...) nature-based account of modern education grounded in Daoism (or Taoism), a school of thought often misunderstood in the West. Daoism has historically been categorized both as a religion (dao jiao 道教) and as a philosophy (dao jia zhe xue 道家哲學); in many cases the spiritual and mystical side of Daoism impresses itself on the reader at the expense of its scientific and philosophical side--as happened with the European missionaries who first exported Daoism to the West. Yet Daoism, especially in relation to pedagogy, cuts across this philosophical/mystical distinction. Happily, Miller and his students, Xiang Li and Tian Ruan, betray no such tendency to pigeon-hole Daoism into one or the other of these categories. The authors adopt a connected and holistic concept of Daoism, which they use to inform and justify their approach to modern education. As such, in the eight chapters of this book, we can see a natural and sensible connection between a holistic Daoism--spiritual, mystical and philosophical--and modern philosophical and educational theories, including Montessori’s cosmic education, Steiner Education, holistic education, and the pedagogical practices of meditation and mindfulness.Miller’s modus operandi is to apply Daoist concepts to contemporary (especially Western) educational issues, both theoretically and practically. In terms of the Daoist belief in the interconnectedness of all things, Miller questions modern subject divisions. When we divide education into geometry, mathematics and so on, we fragment the natural oneness of knowledge and reality as the Daoists would have it. Instead, Miller advocates faith in nature and looks to curricula that reflect the wholeness of nature, such as “cosmic education” and “holistic education” (Chapters 2 and 6). Through such education “we see the relationship between the physical, intellectual, emotional, and spiritual dimensions of life” (p. 27), and feel the support from the invisible and unproven world.Miller makes excellent use of the Daoist concepts of yin (陰) and yang [End Page 1] (陽), which signify the complementary balance and interplay between opposites. He uses the yinyang paradigm to explore the need for balance in a wide range of interesting and important pedagogical situations; for instance, group collaboration versus individual competition, knowledge versus imagination, intuition versus reason, qualitative versus quantitative, etc. (Chapter 5). He also implements yinyang to unpack the model of creative thinking laid down by Graham Wallace (pp. 66 -70); here, yin and yang are applied to a process within the individual. As we move from confusion to enlightenment, we enact within ourselves a dance between our yin and yang factors.Under the heading “Self-Cultivation” (Chapter 3), Miller attempts to evaluate a number of pedagogical strategies with broad ties to Daoism; namely, “silence,” “contemplation,” “calmness,” “sincerity,” “non-violence and embracing the feminine,” and “humility”. These are informed by Miller’s own personal experience of teaching and applying meditation at the University of Toronto. This provides a useful connection between the spiritual and philosophical dao 道, the mystical and the practical. More generally, these strategies recall Daoist wuwei 無爲 (non-coercive or spontaneous action) and ziran 自然 (spontaneity), which Miller subsequently applies to teaching and mindfulness in Chapter 4 (more on which below).Whereas Miller’s contribution is more theoretical, the two chapters written by his students showcase concrete examples of Daoist pedagogy in the classroom. Li’s chapter (Chapter 1) details a class of high school students learning from nature. Here we find a student club centered around a garden, where the students are allowed to wander in the direction of their interests, rather than imbibing the lessons of the teacher according to a top-down lesson plan. Ruan’s chapter (Chapter 7) looks to the various ways play can be utilized in kindergartens for children’s holistic development, including their social, intellectual, spiritual, physical... (shrink)

A new vocabulary has prominently entered the discourse of comparative philosophy. Such philosophy, and philosophy as such, is often supposed to be “global,” “cosmopolitan,” “fusion,” or “post-comparative.” The intention is to have a more global scope in what counts as philosophy and to be more inclusive of standpoints. A key term is “positionality.” In this article, I first translate a tension between globality and positionality into the problem of the possibility of a non-relativist perspectivism. Based on Borges’s Funes el memorioso (...) and The Parable of the Blind Men and the Elephant, I explore hard-to-reconcile variants of perspectivism, particularly as to whether perspectives add up epistemically. I then turn to the example of sovereignty, questioning what the addition or juxtaposition of perspectives means for the practice of global post-comparative philosophy. In conclusion, I revisit my equating the issue of positionality with perspectivism and inquire into the possibility of meaningful fusion. (shrink)

This article argues that xing 性 in the Zhuangzi 莊子 should not be understood as “human nature” but as “human condition.” It introduces the problem of interpreting xing as “human nature” by surveying relevant English-language literature before detailing the interpretive paradigm of Chinese accounts, showing how the latter’s appropriation of the language of substance ontology hinders an accurate portrayal of Daoist xing. It argues that xing should be interpreted in connection to the concept of ming 命 understood as contingent, natural, (...) and temporal “external conditions.” It argues that xing are “internal conditions” that function in conjunction with ming as “external conditions” where “habit” ( xi 習) mediates their interaction. (shrink)

In this article, I briefly discuss contemporary debates about methodological issues in philosophy in Africa to raise concerns about the uptake of diverse philosophical resources at the heart of the global post-comparative method and suggest that the feasibility of the post-comparative method depends on the availability of robust and rich philosophical resources furnished by different traditions and their systematic uptake.

Recently, much attention has been given to Buddhism as a precursor to contemporary holistic theories, and more specifically to the Huayan school’s radical holistic metaphysics (often given the metaphorical name of The Net of Indra), as well as to Huayan’s most elaborate theoretician, Fazang. Nevertheless, contemporary interpretations of Fazang have been weighted by either too strict an adherence to atomistic logic or by unfortunate translations. In this article, I present new translations of the key passages of Fazang’s “The Rafter Dialogue,” (...) as well as a philosophical commentary that explains his departure from atomism. I then proceed to argue that the six characteristics Fazang attributes to a whole that cannot be reduced to its parts are both sufficient and necessary for holism. (shrink)

According to the Satipaṭṭhāna Sutta, mindfulness of the body involves seeing the body in a threefold way: ajjhattaṃ, bahiddhā, and ajjhattabahiddhā. This article attempts to show how an investigation of bodily perception, following the approach adopted by the phenomenologist Maurice Merleau-Ponty, can serve as the basis for a philosophically grounded understanding of the Pāli words ajjhattaṃ and bahiddhā. The interpretation that emerges is the distinction between “right here” and “out there”: two mutually dependent, internally related domains that are experienced as (...) what Merleau-Ponty called the “chiasm” or the “intertwining.” This is different from the standard interpretations found in the Abhidhamma, the Pāli commentaries, the Visuddhimagga, and the instructions of most contemporary meditation teachers. It is hoped that the interpretation offered here can give some exposure to a movement within Theravāda Buddhism, initiated by Ñāṇavīra Thera but slowly gaining traction, characterized by a phenomenological reading of the Pāli sutta s. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Reviewed by:Xiong Shili’s Treatise on Reality and Function by Xiong ShiliLinda Anna Pietrasanta (bio)Xiong Shili’s Treatise on Reality and Function. By Xiong Shili, an Annotated Translation by John Makeham. Oxford Chinese Thought Series. New York: Oxford University Press, 2023. Pp. xliii + 252, Paper $39.95, ISBN 978-0-19-768869-4.John Makeham’s translation of Xiong Shili’s 熊十力 (1885-1968) Tiyong lun 體用 論 [Treatise on Reality and Function] is a major steppingstone for the (...) study of Xiong’s thought. This text, especially when compared to his earlier works, has been largely overlooked both by his contemporaries and scholars interested in his philosophy up to the present day. After all, writing about Buddhism and focusing on the examination of the metaphysical problem of ti and yong during the 1950s--the Tiyong lun was redacted between 1956 and 1957--had considerably less grasp on the general Weltanschauung of the time, compared to the 1920s and 1930s when Xiong produced his most influential works. However, the Tiyong lun is crucial for gaining a comprehensive understanding of Xiong’s philosophical system, as it represents the culmination of his intellectual endeavours. And with this translation, alongside his 2015 translation of the Xin Weishi lun 新唯識論 [Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness], John Makeham provides English-speaking readers with the essential tools to do so. In fact, Xiong himself described the Tiyong lun as a revision of his Xin Weishi lun, making Makeham’s choice of translating precisely these two treatises even more fitting.The Treatise consists of four chapters, with a fifth one--titled Ming xin pian 明心篇 [Explaining Mind]--originally included but later removed and published as a separate book. Generally speaking, the first and fourth chapters--Ming bian 明 變 [Explaining Transformation] and Chengwu 成物 [Forming Material Things]--are primarily focused on presenting the author’s distinctive philosophical position, while the two central chapters--Fofa shang 佛法上 [Buddhist Teachings, A] and Fofa xia 佛法下 [Buddhist Teachings, B]--offer a thorough critique of Madhyamaka and Yogācāra Buddhism.The main aim of the Treatise is to solve “the cosmological problem of the non-duality of Reality and function” (p. 5). Reality (ti 體) is glossed by Xiong as benti 本體 or shiti 實體, understood as the unconditioned, constitutive foundation and origin of ‘its’ function (yong 用), which refers to the realm of phenomena that, in turn, take Reality (ti) as their essence or intrinsic nature. The [End Page 1] fundamental idea underlying Xiong’s entire philosophical endeavour is that ti and yong are not two separate realms (contrary, for example, to the traditional creationist framework of monotheistic religions, where the principle transcends the things it creates) and must be understood as literally “not two” (bu er 不二).The Tiyong lun, although written in the 1950s during the Communist era, does not directly address political issues. As mentioned, it focuses on the problem of ti-yong and, therefore, is a text that should (in Xiong’s view at least) be considered abstracted from its specific historical context, since the conclusion of the non-duality of Reality and function is absolute and universal. However, it is interesting to note that Xiong includes a brief critique of materialism (weiwuzhuyi 唯物主義 ) in the text--again by means of the ti-yong framework--which is somewhat unusual given the materialistic foundation of Marxism (and Communism, as its derivation). Beyond the specific case of the Tiyong lun, the issue of Xiong’s relationship with Communist hegemony is debated.1 On the one hand, the fact that he managed to write and publish a metaphysical work such as the Tiyong lun during the 1950s shows that he retained some leeway and room for manoeuvre. This was likely due to the fact that, by this point, his philosophical works were not as influential as those written during the Republican era. On the other hand, especially in the case of his post-1949 works on ethics (such as Yuan Ru 原儒 [To the Origin of the Ru]), it should be noted that Xiong began to employ Marxist terminology and even attempted a “Marxisation” of the figure of Confucius. However, this is not strongly reflected in the Tiyong lun.Although the scope of the Treatise is laid out straightforwardly, it is a... (shrink)

Scholars who wonder how the Buddha would take sides in the traditional debate on the existence of free will generally believe that it is possible to attribute to him a single point of view capable of reconciling apparent inconsistencies that arise from the reading of the scriptural pages that might be related to this issue. The thesis of this article is that the Buddha’s position on the question of free will is in fact far from being univocal. Rather, in each (...) of the three philosophical registers that can be identified in his teachings, different answers to the same question are implicit—in the personalist dimension of the Buddhadharma, a libertarian language is spoken; the reductionist register of the nonself doctrine, on the other hand, necessarily implies a hard determinist position; and finally, in the antimetaphysical context of the middle path, we find a suspension of judgment regarding the determinism/free will dilemma. (shrink)

A fundamental difference in Svāmi Saccidānandendra Sarasvatī’s (SSS) and the Post-Śaṅkarādvaitins’ (PSA) exegeses of Advaita Vedānta lies in the pedagogic method of adhyāropa-apavāda (deliberate attribution of characteristics to the attribute-less brahman and its corresponding/complementary contradiction). For SSS, adhyāropāpavāda is the sole method to negate avidyā (ignorance); other Upaniṣadic methods— lakṣaṇā and netivāda —are subsumed under it. For the PSA, on the other hand, adhyāropāpavāda plays a subsidiary, less consequential role in engendering gnosis; the primary role is that of mahāvākyas (the (...) “great” Vedāntic statements). SSS denounces the PSA—with the sole exception of Sureśvarācārya —for their (purportedly incorrect) interpretation of the method; he contends that it has led to the lamentable reification of concepts in Advaita Vedānta and ultimately undermined its basic tenets. In this article, I articulate SSS’ position. (shrink)

There is something deeply broken in how modern industrialized societies relate to the natural world. Many ecological theorists, as well as ecologically engaged Buddhists, draw on Buddhist ideas and practices to construct alternative, more wholesome ways of relating to the natural world. This can be understood as a kind of post-comparative global or “fusion” philosophy at work. In this essay, I reflect on fusion philosophy, Buddhism, and the ecological crisis. I argue against the common practice of naturalizing Buddhism, of adapting (...) Buddhism in order to make it conform with specifically modern ideas about the natural world, and advocate for drawing on Buddhist and animist ways of knowing and being to challenge these ideas and help repair our relationship with the more-than-human world. Specifically, I draw on Buddhist meditative practices, phenomenological critique, and recent thinking about the relational and emotional dimensions of knowledge to suggest a path toward a relational, animist epistemology. (shrink)

This article argues that the Sarvāstivāda’s “ X takes Y as svabhāva ” system constitutes a multilayered reduction system where “ X takes Y as svabhāva ” can be understood as “ X is reduced to Y.” Here, svabhāva functions as a means of reduction. The reduction system comprises three layers, and its primary aim is to reduce non-dharma types to dharma types. Furthermore, the article discusses whether the multilayered reduction system is ontological or epistemological. Moreover, based on the third (...) layer of the reduction system, the article suggests that svabhāva has only played a limited role in defining dharma types. (shrink)

I argue that as we move in the twenty-first century we need a new paradigm in global philosophy, which I call “interjacency.” Philosophical authenticity in an age of rapid globalization must take a new form, one which respects the fact that one’s intellectual location is to lie both among and between many worlds of thought. My argument will be that JanMohamed’s important typology for the border intellectual therefore needs to be supplemented; that, in addition to syncretic and specular border intellectuals, (...) a third type must be recognized: the interjacent border intellectual. I detect early hints of a movement in this direction in the original philosophical writings of twentiethcentury philosophers in India, whose dominant paradigm of self-understanding nevertheless remained syncretism, transculturalism, and fusion, and have found more evident articulations in recent mixed-race philosophy and mestizo theory. Living in the cracks between cultures, it is increasingly evident, is a freeing and enabling way to live. (shrink)

This article re-examines Abū Ḥasan al-Ashʿarī’s theological insights on the interplay between faith and reason, challenging previous fideist interpretations, particularly Imran Aijaz’s view. I introduce the concept of guided theistic rationalism, situating al-Ashʿarī’s approach within a tripartite model: contexts of discovery, justification, and review. In the discovery phase, al-Ashʿarī draws inspiration from Qur’anic verses to formulate rational arguments for God’s existence, akin to Ibn Sīnā and Ibn Rushd. The justification phase rigorously validates these arguments through independent logical reasoning. I further (...) propose a context of review, where individuals critically assess pre-existing arguments, ensuring faith is rationally grounded while accommodating divine submission. Al-Ashʿarī’s balanced approach harmonizes reason with revelation, advocating rational scrutiny of prophetic claims followed by wholehearted acceptance. This nuanced framework, integrating rational inquiry with devout submission to divine revelation, holds broader relevance for contemporary monotheistic traditions. (shrink)

Tianyan is a fundamental concept for understanding Yan Fu’s (1854–1921) distinctive approach to modernization. Departing from the pragmatic focus of earlier reformers, he envisioned a path of spiritual and ethical renewal informed by evolutionary science. This paper examines how Yan Fu manipulated the evolutionary ideas of Thomas Huxley (1825–1895) and Herbert Spencer (1820–1903) and integrated them with traditional Chinese metaphysics to conceptualize a new cultural ideology, or the new Way (Dao), against a historical backdrop defined by shifting dynamics between diverse (...) philosophies and worldviews. By examining his tianyan cosmology, the study illuminates Yan’s development of a modern ethical paradigm focused on individual and national character-building amidst historical transformations and cultural dialogues. Yan’s work reveals pathways for cultivating a modern identity and ethical structure within a globalizing context, making his intellectual legacy especially relevant to contemporary reflections on modernity and cross-cultural ethical evolution. (shrink)

Based on contemplating the original concern of the Daodejing, this paper points out that, on a deep existential and practical level, the Dao signifies a new existential structure (and a new world of meaning), which is framed by the “four conforms.” In essence, Laozi proposes the concept of the Dao to inspire an advisable way of life, which can be achieved by transforming the existential structure from "mind controlling the vital energy" to one shaped by the "four conforms." Moreover, the (...) paper argues that the significance of the Dao ultimately goes hand in hand with the revelation of self-sovereignty and human dignity. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:IntroductionArindam Chakrabarti (bio)I. UrgencyAs global tourism and global profiteering businesses keep aggravating the global ecological crisis, the need for global mutual understanding across cultures increases. But digitally drunk human consumers, generally, do not want what they need most, for example, clean air or cultural epistemic humility. Despite almost a century-long tradition of academic verbiage about “cosmopolitanism” and “postcolonial rectification” of the routine erasing, blanketing, and exoticization of non-Western philosophical (...) cultures, constructive and mutually instructive philosophical dialogue across cultures has just barely begun. But only a small minority of philosophers in Europe and America would deny that philosophy needs to be practiced in an intercultural key more urgently now than ever before. For one thing, as was argued succinctly by Jay L. Garfield and Bryan W. Van Norden more than a decade back in The New York Times (Garfield and Van Norden 2016), at least Histories of Philosophy, which only cover the thinkers from Democritus to Deleuze or from Plato to Putnam, should not be named—without a qualifier—as a history of philosophy. The qualifier “Western” must be added.One of the world’s greatest philosophical classics, Bhagavadgītā, was allegedly delivered “between two armies” ready to launch a genocidal war. Whatever universality the philosophical insights in that text may claim could perhaps be attributed, albeit metaphorically, to the tension between the two sides, two conflicting ideologies, and two lifeworlds in between which Krishna’s “metaphysic of morals” (arguably comparable to Kant’s) was formulated. The four essays collected in this special issue of PEW exemplify and theorize different kinds of border-recognizing, border-ignoring, and border-crossing practices of philosophy. They illustrate the fecundity of philosophy done from more than one cultural standpoint, for example, those of classical Buddhist and contemporary Western environmental philosophies, European and Chinese philosophies, African and Euro-American philosophies, and Analytic versus Indian (South Asian) philosophies.But, of course, no comparative (post-comparative or fusion) philosophy can be done without translating texts of one language into another, for example, classical Chinese into English, Sanskrit into French or German, Spanish into [End Page 1] English, or Akan into English, and some day even Japanese into Hindi. Ideally, the bridge-building philosopher herself should be reading both languages, even if she writes only in English (which, for a couple of centuries, now unfortunately irremediably, is the language of publishable “global”/“cosmopolitan” philosophy, often even in the countries of the global south). Comparative philosophy, dependent upon translation, suffers from the same double bind that the act of intercultural translation faces: It cannot be done, yet—now, of all times—it must be done.II. What May We Hope?Jonardon Ganeri, in a talk given at SUNY, Stony Brook, on March 2, 2016, entitled “Why Philosophy Must Go Global,” said optimistically:The world of academic philosophy is now entering a new age, defined neither by colonial need for recognition nor by postcolonial wish to integrate. There is heightened appreciation of the value of world philosophies; internationalization of the student body; a philosophical pluralism which interaction and migration make salient; growing concerns about diversity within a still too-white faculty body and curricular canon; and identification of deep structural problems with the contemporary philosophical academy. We are entering the age of “re-emergence:” (1) philosophies from every region of the world, are finding new autonomous and authentic forms of articulation; (2) philosophical industry, leaving behind a center-periphery mode of production, is becoming again polycentric; (3) Europe and other colonial powers have been provincialized, no longer mandatory conversation partners or points of comparison; (4) philosophers within the largely Anglophone international academy are beginning to acknowledge their responsibility to arrange international institutions to enable open participation, that is, acknowledge that their control over the academy is a fall-out from colonialism rather than a reflection of intellectual superiority. We may thus look to a future of vibrant pluralistic realism in departments of philosophy, and a new cartography of philosophy.The first wave of translations of “oriental” texts into German, English, and other European languages ushered in, at best, giddy universalism. It chanted slogans like “Neo-Platonists like Plotinus and Indian Monists like Śaṃkara were giving... (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:CALL FOR PROPOSALS TRAUMA AND HEALING 12TH EAST-WEST PHILOSOPHER’S CONFERENCE MAY 24-31, 2024 The 12th East-West Philosopher’s Conference will explore the many dimensions of trauma and healing. While trauma can be physical, it can also be psychological, social, political, economic, and cultural—encompassing the immediate effects of global pandemics, the ongoing impacts of ethnic and gender bias, the intergenerational legacies of colonization and geopolitical strife, and the planetary ramifications of (...) anthropogenic climate disruption. Ours is an era in which differences of histories, cultures, and identities are engaged as sources of insight, but also one of retrenchment—a period of relational appreciation, but also one of schism. The global scientific community’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic was a stunning example of human potential for empathetic collaboration in the face of global personal and public health trauma. Yet, the economic trauma of the pandemic has resulted in crumbling international alliances, deepening trade wars, and an unfortunate collective reinvestment in zero-sum endgame framings of geopolitics against which there is no vaccination and through which the terms of healing have become delinked from the restoration of global wholeness. These traumas do not stop shaping our lives when the immediate danger comes to an end. Traumatic pain remains stored in the memories of peoples and individuals, it populates their imagination and shapes horizons of possibility. Thus a philosophical exploration of trauma and healing is not only diagnostic of current problems but also a form of genealogy. We invite participants to reflect upon the relational complexity of both trauma and healing, critically and historically engaging concrete occurrences of trauma while also drawing out theoretical insights regarding healing that strengthens and empowers and resists the forms of personal and social amnesia that make the repetition of trauma so tragically common. Of special interest are panels and papers that explore the trauma and healing at all scales from the interpersonal, to the relational traumas experienced by nations at war and cultures in conflict, thus addressing the interplay of the private and public spheres, of ethics and economics, of the human and the natural sciences, and among disciplines, classes, genders, and generations. Panel and paper proposals are encouraged that explore trauma and healing during the ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, the trauma of refugees, displaced and colonized peoples, trauma and healing in personal relationships, climate change as a form of trauma to the planet and its people, trauma and healing related to issues of gender and sexuality, and how philosophers of all traditions, ancient and modern, cross-culturally deal with trauma and healing. KEYNOTE PRESENTERS: Jin Y. Park, Chair of Philosophy and Religion at American University, Washington DC, “Translating Violence.” Ato Quayson, Jean G. and Morris M. Doyle Professor of Interdisciplinary Studies at Stanford University, CA, “The Ethnography of the Private Sphere: Trauma, Domesticity, and Healing in the Work of Toni Morrison.” We invite proposals for individual papers and panels. Please submit a 250-300 word abstract to the Conference organizers via: [email protected]. Submission Timeline: November 1, 2023 Notifications of acceptance for abstracts and panel proposals received by November 1 will be sent out by December 15, 2023. We have established an early submission timeline to facilitate faculty applying to their own institutions for travel funding. Abstracts received after November 1, 2023, will be vetted as received, taking into consideration the late submission. The absolute deadline for abstract submissions is March 15, 2024. After this, we will not be able to accommodate additional proposals. Final Papers Due: April 15, 2024 CONFERENCE REGISTRATION AND LOGISTICS: Hosted in keeping with the Hawaiian Islands’ spirit of aloha, breakfast and lunch will be provided for all registered presenters, as well as an opening reception and final dinner. The Conference does not provide lodging or travel support, but economical lodgings of various kinds are readily available in Honolulu. ABOUT THE EAST-WEST PHILOSOPHER’S CONFERENCE: The East-West Philosophers’ Conference series is the premier forum for convening philosophers from across the academy who are committed to cross-cultural inquiry. The Conference is the oldest continuous international gathering in Hawai‘i and has been a model of productive collaboration between the University of Hawai‘i at... (shrink)

Cuối năm, chạy khắp xóm đưa tin, bữa nay chạy ngang qua Ao, thấy Bói Cá vẫn thiền định sâu trên cành tre giữa ao. Phóng viên Chẫu xởi lởi: – Chào ông Bói Cá, hôm nay vui vẻ chứ ông. Không thấy đáp, chỉ thấy cái mỏ Bói Cá ngoáy ngoáy, như vẽ chữ vào không khí. Chẫu ta lạ mắt, tiến đến xem. Hóa ra mắt vẫn mở, chẳng qua công tác “ngoáy” sâu sắc quá nên dường như (...) không nghe thấy phàm âm của Chẫu mà thôi. (shrink)

Amazon Book Review Series of “Wild Wise Weird”.

Amazon Book Review Series of “Wild Wise Weird”.

Amazon Book Review Series of “Wild Wise Weird”.

Amazon Book Review Series of “Wild Wise Weird”.

प्रस्तावित शोध-पत्र सत् या निरपेक्ष तथा आभास या जगत संबंधित अवधारणा की शंकराचार्य एवं ब्रैडले के परिप्रेक्ष्य में दार्शनिक विवेचना है। इस शोध-पत्र का प्रमुख उद्देश्य भारतीय एवं पाश्चात्य दार्शनिक जगत के प्रख्यात विद्वानों विशेषतः शंकराचार्य एवं ब्रैडले के सत् एवं आभास संबंधी विचारों में समाविष्ट समानताओं एवं विषमताओं का व्यापक रूप से विश्लेषण प्रस्तुत करना है। इस कारण शोध-पत्र के अंतर्गत सर्वप्रथम, यह प्रदर्शित किया गया है कि क्यों उक्त दोनों दार्शनिकों के संदर्भ में ही सत् एवं आभास की (...) अवधारणा का विवेचन किया गया है। द्वितीयतः, शंकराचार्य एवं ब्रैडले दोनों के सत् या निरपेक्ष संबंधी विचारों की गवेषणा की गई है। तृतीयतः, उक्त दोनों दार्शनिकों के दर्शन में व्याप्त सत् एवं आभास के स्वरूप को विवेचित करते हुए समीक्षात्मक अध्ययन किया गया है और तदुपरांत, अंत में उपर्युक्त सभी पक्षों का गहन मूल्यांकन करते हुए निष्कर्ष को प्रस्तुत करने का प्रयत्न किया गया है।. (shrink)

Albert Camus’ views contributed to the rise of the philosophy known as Absurdism, he defines the Absurd “as the conflict between the human tendency to seek inherent value and meaning in life, and the human inability to find any meaning in a purposeless, meaningless, and irrational universe, with the ‘unreasonable silence’ of the universe in response.” However, this world in itself is not absurd, what is absurd is our relationship with the universe, which is irrational. Camus is considered to be (...) an existentialist, even though he firmly rejected the term throughout his lifetime. He is properly categorised as an atheist existentialist. However, he would also disagree with this label. In his notebooks, he presents the following contradictory statement: -/- “I do not believe in God and I am not an atheist.” -/- This reflects the notion of the Absurd. The search of the possibility of the existence of God is humanly impossible, but this also entails that the proof that God does not exist is impossible too. He writes in The Myth of Sisyphus: “In a universe suddenly divested of illusions and lights, man feels an alien, a stranger. His exile is without remedy since he is deprived of the memory of a lost home or the hope of a promised land. This divorce between man and his life, the actor and his setting, is properly the feeling of absurdity.” The Myth of Sisyphus is a fierce expression of the Absurd. It starts off with a powerful and thought-provoking statement: “There is but one truly serious philosophical problem and that is suicide. Judging whether life is or is not worth living amounts to answering the fundamental question of philosophy.” . (shrink)

The question of the origin of goodness in the Xunzi is an important key to understanding Xunzi’s thoughts. Current interpretation approaches are mainly divided into the sage-centered and Heaven-centered approaches. The sage-centered approach holds that goodness originates from the intelligence or the good potential of the sages. However, this explanation either conflicts with Xunzi’s idea that the gentleman and the petty man have the same endowment or with the theory of bad human nature. The Heaven-centered approach maintains that goodness originates (...) from the Heaven or Dao. However, this approach leads to the problem of the rigidity of moral norms or contradiction with Xunzi’s naturalistic Heaven. In this paper, I point out a third approach, arguing that goodness originates from customs. This interpretation is compatible with Xunzi’s theory of bad human nature and naturalistic Heaven. Also, it avoids the problem of giving special humanity to the sages and the rigidity of moral norms. (shrink)

Contemporary scholarships on various accounts of the concept of harmony in Chinese philosophy have produced fruitful outcomes by examining the term he. A standard use of he to account for harmony comes from the Analects, and this account sets up disjunctions not just between he and tong but also between harmony and tong. Such disjunctions are even more conspicuous in the political discourses from the Zuozhuan and Guoyu, and hence, has led scholars to overlook the more nuanced resonances between tong, (...) he, and harmony that can be identified from other canonical texts, such as in shangtong of the Mozi, in hetong of the Guanzi, and in datong of the Liji. This article aims to present nuanced relations between harmony, he, and tong, and proposes tong as another viable option to express harmony, thereby correcting the imbalance that the predominant scholarships recognize he and neglect tong. (shrink)

The question of the origin of goodness in the Xunzi is an important key to understanding Xunzi’s thoughts. Current interpretation approaches are mainly divided into the sage-centered and Heaven-centered approaches. The sage-centered approach holds that goodness originates from the intelligence or the good potential of the sages. However, this explanation either conflicts with Xunzi’s idea that the gentleman and the petty man have the same endowment or with the theory of bad human nature. The Heaven-centered approach maintains that goodness originates (...) from the Heaven or Dao. However, this approach leads to the problem of the rigidity of moral norms or contradiction with Xunzi’s naturalistic Heaven. In this paper, I point out a third approach, arguing that goodness originates from customs. This interpretation is compatible with Xunzi’s theory of bad human nature and naturalistic Heaven. Also, it avoids the problem of giving special humanity to the sages and the rigidity of moral norms. (shrink)

Amazon Book Review Series of “Wild Wise Weird”.

Contemporary scholarships on various accounts of the concept of harmony in Chinese philosophy have produced fruitful outcomes by examining the term he. A standard use of he to account for harmony comes from the Analects, and this account sets up disjunctions not just between he and tong but also between harmony and tong. Such disjunctions are even more conspicuous in the political discourses from the Zuozhuan and Guoyu, and hence, has led scholars to overlook the more nuanced resonances between tong, (...) he, and harmony that can be identified from other canonical texts, such as in shangtong of the Mozi, in hetong of the Guanzi, and in datong of the Liji. This article aims to present nuanced relations between harmony, he, and tong, and proposes tong as another viable option to express harmony, thereby correcting the imbalance that the predominant scholarships recognize he and neglect tong. (shrink)

In this essay, I argue that the Abhidharma philosopher Saṅghabhadra’s account of conventional reality and truth does lend itself well to Kris McDaniel’s recent pluralist proposal that the Abhidharma Buddhist distinction between conventional truth and ultimate truth is best understood in terms of a more basic distinction between two different ways an entity can exist: conventionally or ultimately. However, McDaniel’s suggested account of conventional and ultimate truth needs to be modified to take into account Saṅghabhadra’s views about the nature of (...) ultimate truth, in particular his claim that there can be ultimate truths about what is conventionally real. For at least some Abhidharma thinkers, much of what is taken to be ultimately true in fact involves a recognition and appreciation of the relationship between what is ultimately real and what is conventionally real. Part of the ultimate truth is knowing the conventionality of the conventional. The account of ultimate and conventional truth I offer here takes this important feature of Saṅghabhadra’s view into account and is thus a better exegetical alternative to the account initially proposed by McDaniel. (shrink)

Amazon Book Review Series of “Meandering Sobriety”.

Amazon Book Review Series of “Wild Wise Weird”.

Amazon Book Review Series of “Wild Wise Weird”.

Lecture on dangers of trend towards colonized mentality in Thai philosophy; delivered originally at village primary school, Kanchanaburi Province, Thailand, January 6th, 1989.

Văn hóa Xóm chim được khen là có trí khôn không tuổi.

This article aims to bridge quantum physics, human cognition, and Kitarō Nishida's logic of basho. The primary claim is that the indeterminacy underlying both quantum and cognitive phenomena is synonymous with Nishida’s “absolute nothingness”, the ontological basis of the logic. By interpreting Nishida’s soku hi dialectic in terms of phenomenal appearances in awareness, Nishida’s term “basho” is equated with this place where awareness actualises thereby allowing Nishida’s three basho to be framed in terms of the degree of subjectivity present within (...) awareness. Connections between logic of basho and the theory of enactive cognition are set out with emphasis on how cognitive representation can be placed in the human’s enactive engagement with reality. As the logic of basho accounts for the dialectical nature of both quantum reality and cognitive reality, the article concludes that his logic can be seen as encompassing physical reality as well as the reality of (non-)subjective awareness. (shrink)

In the 1932 version of his New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness, Xiong Shili interprets the classical Chinese Book of Changes as an illustration of the basic configurations of consciousness. His interpretation relies on concepts developed by Yogācāra Buddhism, which he criticizes, adapts, and translates into language that can then be applied to the Confucian and Neo-Confucian traditions. As a result, Xiong’s interpretation of the Book of Changes bears comparison with more recent phenomenological readings of both Yogācāra Buddhism and (...) Neo-Confucianism. (shrink)

Amazon Book Review Series of “Wild Wise Weird”.

Amazon Book Review Series of “Wild Wise Weird”.

Tập truyện ngụ ngôn Bói Cá là công cụ giáo dục giá trị và truyền cảm hứng. Trong bối cảnh con người ngày càng dễ thụ động và xa rời các giá trị truyền thống, tác phẩm này là lời nhắc nhở về tầm quan trọng của việc đọc và duy trì những giá trị nhân văn cốt lõi. Những câu chuyện trong tập truyện không chỉ là hành trang cho trẻ em, mà còn khơi nguồn suy ngẫm cho mỗi (...) chúng ta về ý nghĩa của cuộc sống. (shrink)