History of Western Philosophy

Between May 1928 and January 1930, Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi and Bartholomeus De Ligt engaged in an intense and detailed debate over the justifications for war, much of which was published in Young India. De Ligt argued that Gandhi could not be considered the moral successor of Tolstoy, as the Mahatma had participated in British-led wars three times: during the second Boer War (1899–1902), the Zulu rebellion (1906), and the Great War against the European Central Powers. Throughout this dispute, De Ligt (...) condemned violence as a means of resolving conflicts under any circumstances, rejecting war unconditionally. He championed a highly ethical and idealistic form of anarcho-pacifism, promoting a creed of fraternity and showing himself to be a man of uncompromising principles. In contrast, Gandhi demonstrated a pragmatic approach, supporting the loyalty of his fellow countrymen to the British Empire in exchange for the potential granting of dominion status. Despite his humanitarian ideals, Gandhi’s philosophy combined a sort of realistic cunning with a profound faith in ahisma, seeing non-violence as a doctrine susceptible to development and modification. From this perspective, he shared a form of relative pacifism that justified war under certain conditions. (shrink)

This article presents a comparative reading of Schelling's Neue Deduktion des Naturrechts and Fichte's Grundlage des Naturrechts. Both thinkers adopt the idealist strategy of deducing right (Recht) from I-hood (Ichheit) and insist, as a result, that right neither derives from nor depends on the moral law. But while Fichte deduces right from the “pure I-hood” uncovered in intellectual intuition, Schelling deduces it from the “absolute I-hood” postulated by practical reason. This difference generates a disagreement regarding the derivative relationship between right (...) and morality. Whereas Fichte assigns right (unlike morality) a merely conditional and limited practical validity, Schelling contends that right is as unconditionally and universally valid as the moral law. (shrink)

In the First Analogy, Kant argues that because we mark the passage of time on the objects of experience, in order to represent the unity of time, we must represent the world as consisting of a single substance that can never be created or destroyed. We must rule out gaps in time's passage, and incommensurable timelines. It is argued here that Mary Shepherd likewise holds that we mark the passage of time on the objects of experience, but that she meets (...) Kant's criteria for representing the unity of time with ontological holism rather than his required monism. (shrink)

This paper explores the metaphysical and metaphilosophical irony of the British philosopher F. H. Bradley (1846–1924). Using Richard Rorty's account of irony in Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity, it advances a reading of Bradley's work as one in which he ironically plays absolute idealism, pragmatism, and skepticism off each other. It then develops an account of the deeper reason for such an ironic approach to metaphysics, namely, that Bradley aimed to secure both the autonomy of metaphysical inquiry against incursions by science, (...) religion, and morality, and the limits of such inquiry against the more exuberant idealists of his generation. (shrink)

Kant remained throughout his life committed to the idea that we can justifiably hope humankind is progressing. But there are important changes in how he conceptualized this hope. This paper maps out two underappreciated shifts in Kant's thinking between his final word on the subject, in his 1797 An Old Question Raised Again, and his accounts of hope in progress in earlier texts, including the Common Saying essay and Toward Perpetual Peace. The paper also shows that this new account remedies (...) some problems with his pre-1797 discussions. (shrink)

Plato, across several dialogues, praises a combination of spiritedness and gentleness and criticizes an imbalance between these two traits. Unsurprisingly, we see Plato warn against excessively spirited interlocutors in the Republic and Philebus; surprisingly, the Visitor in the Sophist prefers an only gentle interlocutor. This paper argues that we can explain this preference by considering aim in philosophical discussion. Through exploring the relation between gentleness and spiritedness and several main aims, this paper emphasizes how Plato was concerned about mapping philosophical (...) aim onto types of interlocutors, and considered traits such as these important in choosing an interlocutor for philosophical discussion. (shrink)

This article aims to reconstruct the concept of “race” in Nietzsche's work, particularly in his late writings. We seek to test the hypothesis that Nietzsche attempted to reform the concept of race to overcome the descriptive and normative shortcomings of classical racialist theories, by making the notion (a) descriptively more accurate and (b) better suited to his normative agenda. Tosituate Nietzsche's views within a purely abstract space of conceptual possibilities, the first section outlines two contemporary approaches in the philosophy of (...) race, Kwame Appiah's naturalist-eliminativist approach and Sally Haslanger's constructivist approach, both in their original formulations. The subsequent sections examine Nietzsche's treatment of the problem of race, aiming to extract a definition of the concept and assess the extent to which it retains elements of the classical conception while proposing a reformed version of it. Nietzsche employs the term “race” in various ways, sometimes referring to nations and ethnic groups, sometimes to classes and social stratifications. While he rejects key presuppositions of the racialist view – denying that races are biologically discrete units – he replaces it with a proto-constructivist, culturalist and historicist notion in which races are made rather than innate. Nonetheless, he draws on Lamarck’s thesis of the inheritance of acquired characters as a means of preserving the concept’s explanatory ambitions without relying on essentialist assumptions. The final part of the article evaluates the strengths and limitations of this reformed concept of race from both an explanatory and normative perspective, using criteria internal and external to Nietzsche’s philosophical commitments. Although Nietzsche resolutely opposes antisemitism and intrinsic racism, he nonetheless makes racist generalizations and advocates a eugenic project aimed at breeding a“purified” European race, often with strong imperialist overtones. However, when disentangled from the more problematic aspects of his normative agenda, his approach may still offer valuable insights for both political and explanatory purposes. (shrink)

The Philosophical Contribution of Kostas Axelos: The Issue of the Open System and Technological Civilization -/- Kostas Axelos (1924–2010) remains one of the most intriguing and underexplored figures in contemporary philosophy. His work, situated at the crossroads of Marxism, Heideggerian phenomenology, and the philosophy of technology, raises critical questions about the nature of modern civilization and the fate of thought in an increasingly technological world. One of the central academic issues in Axelos’ thought is his concept of the "open system," (...) which presents a radical alternative to both dialectical materialism and structuralism. This issue is especially relevant in our age of digital globalization and algorithmic governance, as it poses fundamental questions about the limits of human autonomy and the possibilities of thought in a technologically determined world. -/- The Open System: A Critique of Closed Philosophical Paradigms -/- Axelos’ notion of the "open system" challenges traditional metaphysical and epistemological assumptions that rely on closure, determinacy, and finality. Unlike Hegelian dialectics, which seeks resolution through synthesis, Axelos proposes a dynamic, ever-unfolding process that resists totalization. His critique extends to Marxist orthodoxy, which he argues falsely assumes a teleological closure in history. By advocating an open-ended view of reality, Axelos aligns himself with thinkers like Nietzsche and Heidegger, emphasizing a world in flux rather than one governed by fixed structures or ultimate goals. -/- This issue raises critical academic debates: How can philosophical thought remain relevant in an era dominated by technological systems that impose rigid structures on human existence? Is the "open system" a viable framework for understanding contemporary globalized societies, or does it risk devolving into an abstract and impractical relativism? -/- For Axelos, closed systems—whether philosophical, political, or scientific—seek to impose rigid frameworks that ultimately stifle thought and creativity. He sees Western metaphysical traditions as largely obsessed with categorization and finality, which leads to an artificial separation between subject and object, mind and world, theory and practice. In contrast, his "open system" embraces indeterminacy and fluidity, recognizing that reality is in perpetual motion and that any attempt to fix meaning within rigid boundaries leads to intellectual stagnation. -/- Axelos’ concept also engages with existentialist and phenomenological traditions, particularly in how it resists essentialist definitions of being. He challenges not only the dogmas of classical metaphysics but also structuralist tendencies that seek to analyze reality in terms of fixed codes and relationships. Instead, Axelos suggests that the world should be understood as a game (le jeu du monde), a process of continuous becoming where human existence is not predefined but rather shaped by the interactions of open-ended forces. This issue raises critical academic debates: How can philosophical thought remain relevant in an era dominated by technological systems that impose rigid structures on human existence? Is the "open system" a viable framework for understanding contemporary globalized societies, or does it risk devolving into an abstract and impractical relativism? Furthermore, how does Axelos' open system relate to contemporary discussions of complexity theory, cybernetics, and ecological thinking, all of which emphasize the interconnectedness and dynamism of systems? -/- A related issue in Axelos' work is his analysis of technological civilization. In Le Jeu du Monde (The Play of the World), he argues that technological advancement has not only transformed human existence but has also reshaped the very way we think and conceptualize reality. Technology, in Axelos’ view, is not merely a tool but a fundamental mode of being that structures our world and thought processes. -/- This raises significant academic concerns about autonomy, alienation, and the role of philosophy. If technology governs human thought as Axelos suggests, can there be genuine freedom in intellectual and political life? How does one resist technological determinism without retreating into romanticized notions of pre-technological existence? Axelos does not advocate for a rejection of technology but rather calls for a new form of thinking that embraces its presence while resisting its totalizing tendencies. -/- Axelos highlights the paradox of technological civilization: while it offers immense possibilities for connectivity, knowledge production, and efficiency, it also risks subordinating human creativity and autonomy to systemic logic. He critiques the way in which technology, rather than serving human purposes, increasingly dictates them—turning individuals into passive participants in a mechanized world. The dominance of algorithmic governance, artificial intelligence, and automation exemplifies the culmination of this technological destiny, raising profound concerns about the future of human agency. -/- Furthermore, Axelos’ thought resonates with contemporary debates about digital culture, surveillance capitalism, and the commodification of knowledge. As digital technologies reshape the nature of labor, communication, and governance, the question arises: To what extent can individuals maintain authentic engagement with the world when technological mediation defines nearly every aspect of existence? In this sense, Axelos anticipates concerns found in posthumanist and critical media theories, particularly regarding the erosion of subjectivity in the face of ever-expanding cybernetic systems. -/- Another crucial aspect of Axelos’ critique is the way in which technological civilization imposes a fragmented, instrumentalized view of knowledge. He challenges the reduction of thought to mere data-processing and the dominance of specialized, compartmentalized disciplines that fail to grasp the holistic nature of existence. By contrast, his open system philosophy encourages a mode of thinking that resists fragmentation and embraces a planetary perspective, one that acknowledges the interrelation of philosophy, science, politics, and art in an ever-evolving world. (shrink)

According to the Danish-American Egyptologist Rune Nyord, almost everything conventionally held about ancient Egyptian notions of death is incorrect, or, at best, founded on unjustified assumptions...

The volume delves into the multifaceted history of Lisbon's Jesuit College of Santo Antão, tracing its evolution from its establishment to the eventual suppression of the Society of Jesus. This scholarly work examines an array of themes, including the college’s innovative pedagogical practices, its architectural developments, and its significant contributions to the preservation of a rich literary heritage. Moreover, the volume situates the institution within broader social and scientific context.

Following an overview of Mark Textor's wide-ranging narrative in The Disappearance of the Soul and the Turn Against Metaphysics, I note his treatment of the discussion of Brentano's thesis and discuss that of the naturalistic opposition to Brentano, Textor's understanding of the concept of Austrian Philosophy and raise a question about the survival of metaphysics he advocates.

Under the Directoire, manners and morals (mœurs) became an essential political instrument for ‘forming’ citizens and conveying republican values. Intensive reflection on how republican convictions and identification with the republic could be conveyed under modern social and economic conditions accompanied the Directorial government's educational and symbolic political activities. The article examines, in particular, the theories of Emmanuel Joseph Sieyès, Pierre Louis Roederer, and Jean Baptiste Say. These authors shared the conviction that the ancient idea of republican virtue was no longer (...) realizable in the modern age. In their theories, the concept of ‘vertu’ was replaced by considerations of manners and morals (mœurs). However, as the study shows, what took place was not simply a conceptual replacement of ‘vertu’ by ‘mœurs’, with the latter retaining the moral connotation of the former. In fact, the authors mentioned wanted to develop ‘mœurs’ into a unifying concept for describing autonomous social and economic processes. The discourse on manners, it is argued, underwent another significant transformation around 1800 not only for political reasons but also due to the insight into the limited scope for controlling these processes, thereby opening the way for early liberal conceptions. (shrink)

While Adam Smith’s scepticism of European imperialism is well documented, he also argued that liberty and empire can be reconciled in certain forms of government. For Smith, liberty requires a regular and lawful government. In the context of empires, liberty hinges on the sovereign’s capacity to control local magistrates in remote provinces. Through close examination of the history of the Roman Empire, Smith recognised the superiority of monarchies to republics in securing the liberty of distant areas. However, the overextended governance (...) in modern overseas empires aggravated political oppression due to the delegation of sovereign power to provincial governors. For Smith, the flaw in modern commercial empires is not simply the conflation of merchants and sovereignty, but also a geopolitical issue rooted in the extension of distance between the metropole and the colonies. This article further analyses Smith’s scheme to reform the British Empire within the framework of his broader analysis of distant empires. He envisioned that a large-scale imperial union underpinned by political representation could be a solution to the dilemma of imperial governance in the age of globalisation. Therefore, Smith found empire and liberty potentially compatible in his political design. (shrink)

Kant's emphasis on the aesthetic idea permeates the judgment of beauty and the creation of beauty. This paper argues that both natural and artistic beauty are concrete expressions of aesthetic ideas. Regarding natural beauty, the subject appreciates the natural object through a dual grasp of the aesthetic normal idea and the rational idea. Regarding artistic beauty, the aesthetic idea can make the rational idea sensible, allowing the subject to derive aesthetic pleasure by reflecting on the aesthetic representations of rational ideas. (...) Moreover, genius as a natural gift is capable of giving rules for creating artistic beauty, in which the spirit realizes the universal expression of the aesthetic idea. In Kant's framework, the combination of taste and genius provides a context for reflective judgment, which can thus be reconciled with the “free play of the imagination and the understanding.” In this way, the aesthetic idea embodies the dual perspective of subject and object, thereby furnishing a normative dimension to Kant's aesthetics. (shrink)

1. Οντολογία του Παιγνίου Μία από τις πιο σημαντικές συνεισφορές του Αξελού είναι η θεωρία του περί του «κοσμικού παιγνίου». Σύμφωνα με αυτήν, ο κόσμος δεν είναι ούτε ένα αυστηρό σύστημα καθορισμένων νόμων, ούτε ένα χαοτικό σύνολο τυχαίων γεγονότων, αλλά ένα δυναμικό παίγνιο που εμπλέκει τη δημιουργία, την καταστροφή και τη μεταμόρφωση. Η έννοια του παιγνίου επιτρέπει μια ανοιχτή, μη δογματική προσέγγιση του Κόσμου, όπου το είναι και το γίγνεσθαι αλληλοδιαπλέκονται. Με αυτόν τον τρόπο, απορρίπτει την παραδοσιακή δυϊστική διάκριση μεταξύ (...) υποκειμένου και αντικειμένου, προτείνοντας μια πιο ολιστική/αποσπασματική και ρευστή προσέγγιση στην κατανόηση της ύπαρξης. -/- 2. Η Επιρροή του Ηράκλειτου και του Χέγκελ Η σκέψη του Αξελού αντλεί σημαντική έμπνευση από τον Ηράκλειτο και τον Χέγκελ. Ο Ηράκλειτος με την έννοια του γίγνεσθαι και της διαρκούς μεταβολής, καθώς και ο Χέγκελ με τη διαλεκτική του μεθοδολογία, αποτελούν βασικά σημεία αναφοράς στο έργο του. Ωστόσο, ο Αξελός διαφοροποιείται, προτείνοντας μια μη τελεολογική διαλεκτική, η οποία απορρίπτει την τελική σύνθεση και αφήνει ανοιχτό το ενδεχόμενο της αέναης κίνησης και του συνεχούς μετασχηματισμού. Η ανοιχτή σκέψη προϋποθέτει την αποδοχή της αβεβαιότητας και της ρευστότητας της ύπαρξης, απορρίπτοντας κάθε είδους απόλυτο σύστημα γνώσης. Αυτή η προσέγγιση οδηγεί σε μια νέα φιλοσοφική στάση, όπου η σκέψη δεν επιδιώκει να επιβάλει σταθερούς κανόνες, αλλά να βρίσκεται σε διαρκή διάλογο με το άγνωστο και το ανοίκειο. -/- 3. Το Τεχνικό Φαινόμενο και η Μοντέρνα Εποχή Ο Αξελός αναγνωρίζει την τεχνική ως μια από τις πλέον κυρίαρχες δυνάμεις της σύγχρονης εποχής. Στο έργο του "Το Τεχνικό Φαινόμενο" εξετάζει τον τρόπο με τον οποίο η τεχνική δεν αποτελεί απλώς ένα εργαλείο στα χέρια του ανθρώπου, αλλά μια κοσμοϊστορική διαδικασία που διαμορφώνει το ίδιο το είναι του κόσμου. Η τεχνική δεν περιορίζεται στη χρήση μηχανών ή στην τεχνολογική πρόοδο, αλλά αποτελεί μια συνολική δυναμική που καθορίζει τις σχέσεις του ανθρώπου με τον κόσμο και τον ίδιο του τον εαυτό. Μέσω της τεχνικής, η ανθρωπότητα προσπαθεί να ελέγξει τον κόσμο, αλλά ταυτόχρονα χάνει την επαφή με την κοσμική διάσταση της ύπαρξής της. Αυτό οδηγεί σε μια κρίση της νεωτερικότητας, όπου η τεχνολογία γίνεται κυρίαρχη αλλά και ανεξέλεγκτη. Η τεχνική δεν λειτουργεί απλώς ως ένα μέσο που εξυπηρετεί τον άνθρωπο, αλλά γίνεται μια αυτόνομη δύναμη που αποξενώνει το άτομο από τη φυσική του ύπαρξη. Ο Αξελός, επηρεασμένος από τη Χεγκελιανή και Μαρξιστική παράδοση, αλλά και από τον Χάιντεγκερ, θεωρεί ότι η τεχνική μεταβάλλει τον άνθρωπο σε απλό χρήστη και διαχειριστή, περιορίζοντας τη δυνατότητά του για ουσιαστική φιλοσοφική σκέψη και ελεύθερη δημιουργία. Αυτή η αποξένωση εκδηλώνεται στην αποκοπή του ανθρώπου από το κοσμικό παιχνίδι της ύπαρξης, καθώς εγκλωβίζεται σε έναν μηχανιστικό και λειτουργικό τρόπο σκέψης. Παρότι ο Αξελός ασκεί κριτική στη μονόπλευρη κυριαρχία της τεχνικής, δεν την απορρίπτει εξολοκλήρου. Αντίθετα, τη θεωρεί μέρος του παιχνιδιού του κόσμου, μιας αέναης κίνησης που δεν μπορεί να εγκλωβιστεί σε αυστηρά οριοθετημένες κατηγορίες. Το πρόβλημα δεν βρίσκεται στην τεχνική αυτή καθαυτή, αλλά στην άκριτη αποδοχή της ως μοναδικού τρόπου σχέσης με τον Κόσμο. Η τεχνική, ενώ αποτελεί αναπόφευκτο στοιχείο της εξέλιξης, εγκυμονεί τον κίνδυνο της αποξένωσης όταν λειτουργεί ανεξέλεγκτα και χωρίς στοχαστική και ποιητική θεώρηση. Η φιλοσοφία του Αξελού προτείνει μια πιο ανοιχτή προσέγγιση, όπου η τεχνική δεν θα αντιμετωπίζεται ως υπέρτατη δύναμη, αλλά ως μία από τις πολλές διαστάσεις της ανθρώπινης ύπαρξης. Ο Αξελός προτείνει μια ανοιχτή στάση απέναντι στην τεχνική, όπου ο άνθρωπος θα παραμείνει συνειδητός συμμέτοχος στο παιχνίδι του κόσμου, αντί να μετατραπεί σε απλό εκτελεστή μιας τεχνολογικής αναγκαιότητας. (shrink)

A short book of intellectual history is a rare treat. Such is Robin Mills’s recent study of the religious innatism debate in Britain: in just a few brief chapters, we get a comprehensive guide of t...

Few characters in Western popular culture are as iconic as the Creature from Mary Shelley’s Frankenstein, even if most who can sketch the image of Boris Karloff’s bolts and scars would be able to o...

This book expands the known canon by presenting arguments and concepts from women philosophers, from all periods of the history of philosophy, from antiquity to the present day. The collaborative collection is an undertaking that emerged from intensive discussions on how to expand the philosophical canon, which formed the conclusion of the Libori Summer School 2019. This Libori Summer School, the third in a row, was held to enhance the study of texts written by women philosophers from Antiquity up to (...) now and intended to give opportunity to young scholars to connect and to build networks. -/- Presenting such a collection is even more urgent today because a diversification of the canon has long been called for. Nevertheless, to date there is little explicit material available for this purpose. To make this book suitable for both academics and students, it is structured in such a way that readers can use excerpts and individual chapters from it that suit their needs, be it in moral philosophy, politics, or phenomenology, etc. Containing chapters on women such as Suor Juana, Emilie Du Châtelet, and Nisia Floresta and supplemented by contextualization, namely by some brief biographical information and by the systematic integration of her argument into the debates of the respective periods, this book is an important resource highlighting the achievements and value of women in philosophy and calling for a further diversification of the canon. (shrink)

A profession from a mere private teacher to an International Linguistic Author, Rituparna Ray Chaudhuri, whom Literary World often calls an “innate creator” or ‘Divine Vengeance’, has proved herself when she had won to her surprise Harvard World Records and London Book of World Record. Living now in a suburb called Madhyamgram (West Bengal), this Semantic Scholar and Writer on English and British Literature, has widely-acclaimed her name in World of Literature with title ‘Blood is Memory without Language: A Litterateur’ (...) to The Daily Guardian. Precious Kashmir has called this Author, “Art is never finished; only abandoned” means “Artists are never really done with a project – there's always more that can be improved.”. (shrink)

In this paper, I examine Frank Jackson’s (1998) defense of conceptual analysis and flag some of the problems with his defense. If I am right about my criticisms, then, firstly, we do not desperately need conceptual analysis because neither our science nor metaphysics need to be committed to completeness and entailment. This was shown by methodological physicalism. Secondly, conceptual analysis does not give us the expected results. If we expect the conceptual analysis to give us apriori results (in the sense (...) of counterfactual intensions) we are mistaken. There is no fundamental reason to assume that any of our ordinary and natural language concepts are a good way to start to dig for real apriori results. It is equally possible that these results are not discoverable by the human mind. Thirdly, if we can give up apriori results with empirical discovery, then Lycan (1988) is right that we can give up large chunks of our folk concept of free will and still be realist about free will. There is no need to define free will in a way that is near enough to or a natural extension of the folk concept of free will to be a realist about free will. (shrink)

My argument here is two-fold. I agree with Nagel that folk experience of absurdity and the way this experience is conceptually articulated (“the standard arguments for absurdity”) is distorted and confused. However, I argue that his proposed philosophical articulation of the absurd is not coherent and deprives the folk experience of the absurd from its true and original crux hidden behind its confused expressions. Here, firstly, I review the main argument of Nagel’s paper and compare his liberal “ironic view” of (...) absurdity to Camus’s “heroic view.’ (Sect 1). Then, I highlight some inconsistencies in his argument and some difficulties in his account (Sect. 2). Finally, I will propose a eudemonic approach to absurdity. Here, I contrast socialist humor with liberal ironic or heroic attitudes to absurdity (Sect. 3). (shrink)

In Chapter III of Principia Mathematica and several later writings, Russell gave a proof to show that definite descriptions are “incomplete symbols” that have “no meaning in isolation”. Despite the importance Russell seems to attach to the proof, many commentators have regarded it as obviously fallacious. Perkins has offered an interpretation that aims to rehabilitate the proof, but does not, I suggest, vindicate the conclusion about meaning in isolation in a sufficiently robust sense. This paper aims to close that gap (...) by offering an alternative interpretation according to which the proof relies on Russellian ideas about propositional structure. It concludes by revisiting the frequently debated question of whether Russell could have accepted a generalized-quantifier treatment of definite descriptions on which they denote second-order properties. (shrink)

This paper considers the significance of informal publication and circulation in the work of the philosopher Saul Kripke (1940-2022). It argues that everyday copying technologies (e.g. tape recording, photocopying) enabled academics in the 1970s and 1980s to create living documents whose private preservation and circulation maintained a community of interest and makes a case for understanding these technologies and techniques of reproduction as essential to the composition of Kripke’s ground-breaking published work. Kripke lectured a great deal, usually without notes, and (...) was known to be reluctant to commit his ideas to print; this so-called ‘samizdat’ preserved a space for the oral as the preferred mode of communication for philosophical discourse, connecting the modern tradition with the ancients, while the recordings, transcripts and photocopies archived Kripke’s ideas and secured access outside of institutional publishing channels. (shrink)

In this paper, we analyze Jaakko and Merrill Hintikka’s interpretation of Wittgenstein’s arguments against epistemic privacy. The main focus of the paper is to explore their views on this issue and examine the connections between their argumentation and that of Saul Kripke to see to what extent these views coincide. The reason for comparing the said authors is that they all oppose the received view of the argument against private language, which claims that the discussion of private language begins with (...) PI 243. In fact, these philosophers claim that Wittgenstein already discussed the issue of the impossibility of a private language in his rule–following reflections, especially in PI 201 and 202. We will also explore some drawbacks of the interpretation of Wittgenstein offered by the Hintikkas and attempt to provide an overall perspective of the viability of their position in relation to Wittgenstein’s argument against epistemic privacy. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is twofold. One is to show that Aristotle’s study of examples in Prior Analytics (An. Pr.) and Rhetoric (Rh.) (and in particular the ‘comparison’ (parabole) described in Rh 2.20) is useful for philosophy and, moreover, it underlies Aristotle’s discussion of examples in several passages of his philosophical writings. The second is to show that in order to correctly understand the examples that Aristotle presents in his philosophical writings, it is crucial for the reader to successfully (...) identify their logical structure (a task made difficult by the heterogeneous structures covered by Aristotelian examples) and, in the case of comparisons, to identify the relevant features of the illustration presented within its context of use. (shrink)

Most work on John Stuart Mill focuses on his account of civil or political liberties. But as Bruce Baum (2006) argues, Mill's commitment to “the free development of individuality” applied in the economic sphere as well as the social and political. As part of his decentralized, ‘liberal’, socialism (McCabe, 2021) he endorsed a ‘pluralist’ economy which combined consumer- and producer-co-operatives with some state provisions. This ‘utopia’ reveals a road untravelled by both socialism and liberalism, but aimed at achieving normative principles (...) dear to both – liberty, equality, security, fraternity, and progress – and which is worth serious consideration today. Dale E. Miller (2003) argues that, given the arguments of On Liberty, Mill should have been open to ‘capitalistic’ as well as ‘socialistic’ enterprises in his utopia. I argue that Mill's socialism (and his account of transition) involves a significant change in attitudes, which would rule out ‘capitalistic’ motivations and thus structures and organisations. One such structure is the labour market. Building on earlier work (McCabe, 2021) and comments by Joseph Persky (2024), I explore the implications of Mill's commitment to ending a competitive labour market whilst maintaining the plurality of economic enterprises for capital, ‘progress’, and Mill's commitment to diversity. (shrink)

The paper is structured into two main sections. Following a brief introduction, the second section delves into various overarching topics regarding Mark Textor’s work The Disappearance of the Soul and the Turn against Metaphysics. Specifically, it examines certain omissions within Textor’s portrayal of the history of philosophy of mind, notably the oversight of Freud and Du Bois-Reymond, and considers some general issues concerning Brentano’s understanding of the mind. In the subsequent third section, the paper advocates Mach’s neutral monism from an (...) epistemological perspective, aiming to circumvent potential metaphysical problems associated with the concept of mind. (shrink)

1. Imagine that all our beliefs are organized as a web. Let us also imagine that there is a hierarchy among our beliefs. The stronger beliefs, located closer to the centre of the web, underpin the...

Despite its position in an introductory work to logic, the account of continuity presented by Abū Naṣr Al-Fārābī in his paraphrase of Aristotle’s Categories is apparently even less accessible to the beginner than Aristotle’s original. This is in part because Al-Fārābī integrated elements of the accounts of continuity in Aristotle’s Physics and Metaphysics into an account mainly derived from Aristotle’s Categories. While Al-Fārābī’s account chiefly follows Aristotle’s Categories 6 in describing a continuous object that can be divided into parts with (...) a shared boundary, it borrows the terminology of limits from Physics 5 and the notion of quantity as divisible into its parts from Metaphysics 5.13. In doing so, Al-Fārābī defines continuity using a notion of a limit without determining whether or not it was part of the continuous quantity. This definition could also accommodate atomists, since it would work even if the limit were an atom or several atoms that were part of the continuous object. The broadness of this definition is probably intended to allow students of logic who may have atomist tendencies to accept the account of quantity in the categories tradition, even though they may not be ready to reject atomism until after studying physics. (shrink)

This paper explores a specific problem within an important philosophical genre of the fourteenth century: the debates over the perfection of species. It investigates how the problem of defining limits for continuous magnitudes – a problem typical of Aristotelian physics – was integrated into these debates at the levels of genera, species, and individuals as these entities began to be conceptualized in quantitative terms. After explaining the emergence of this problem within fourteenth-century metaphysics, the paper examines the contributions of three (...) philosophers – Hugolinus of Orvieto, John of Ripa, and Paul of Venice – who offered varying solutions to the challenge of defining limits between species. It demonstrates that two primary solutions arose, inspired by continuous and discrete mathematical objects. It is shown that whereas Hugolinus of Orvieto advocates for a continuist model, John of Ripa proposes a discrete one. The last part of the paper examines Paul of Venice's hybrid approach, which combines elements from both models, facilitating a more comprehensive treatment of species particularly difficult to analyse, namely geometric figures. The conclusions of this comparative study underscore how profoundly the metaphysical reflections of the Middle Ages contributed to the analysis of the structure of the continuum and the extension of the notion of quantity to various objects. (shrink)

During the thirteenth century, Aristotelian hylomorphism became the cornerstone of scholastic natural philosophy. However, this theory was fragmented into a plurality of interpretations and reformulations, sparking a rich philosophical debate. This article focuses on Robert Grosseteste (d. 1253), one of the earliest Latin philosophers to directly engage with Aristotle’s natural philosophy. Specifically, it delves into Grosseteste’s perspective on hylomorphism, emphasizing two controversial doctrines that characterized British scholasticism in the late thirteenth century: universal hylomorphism and formal pluralism. The former claims that (...) all substances, whether bodily or spiritual, are hylomorphic compounds, that is, they are made of matter and form. Formal pluralism, in turn, maintains that hylomorphic substances possess more than one substantial form simultaneously. After a brief introduction, the paper proceeds, first, to examine the type of hylomorphism endorsed by Grosseteste, shedding light on an obscure passage that seems to suggest universal hylomorphism. Second, the examination expands on Grosseteste’s theory of bodily form and emphasizes the apparent contradiction of this theory with universal hylomorphism. The discussion then turns to Grosseteste’s endorsement of formal pluralism and the functionality he envisioned being expressed by the bodily form. Finally, the paper draws conclusions about Grosseteste’s revised hylomorphic account. (shrink)

When Aristotle introduces the complete moods, he refers back to the dictum de omni et nullo, a semantic condition for universal affirmations and negations. There recently has been renewed interest in the question whether the dictum validates the assertoric syllogistic. I rehearse evidence that Aristotle provides a mereological semantics for universal affirmations and negations, and note that this semantics entails a nonstandard reading of the dictum, under which the dictum, in the presence of a minimal logical apparatus, indeed validates the (...) assertoric syllogistic. I argue that this mereological validation offers advantages over recent discussions in Morison, Malink, Ebert and Vlasits. (shrink)

The title of Georg Essen’s recent book sounds like an oxymoron: Fragile Souveränität—how can ‘sovereignty’ be ‘fragile’? Sovereignty has been regarded as one of the strongest powers in the history...

The Universal Law of Balance: Preventing Poverty, Conflict, War, and the Misinterpretation of Religious Teachings -/- Introduction -/- Human civilization has long struggled with poverty, conflict, war, and social inequality, despite advancements in science, technology, and economic development. The root cause of these persistent problems is not simply a lack of resources but systemic imbalances caused by wrong decision-making—decisions based on false information, greed, corruption, short-term thinking, and rigid belief systems. -/- Among the most significant contributors to global imbalance is (...) religious misinterpretation and dogmatism. While the original teachings of religious founders often emphasized compassion, justice, and balance, their followers have frequently misinterpreted or distorted these teachings to justify violence, inequality, oppression, and resistance to progress. These flawed interpretations have created religious conflicts, economic injustices, and social divisions, violating the universal law of balance in nature—a principle that states that all systems must function in harmony to sustain stability and well-being. -/- If humanity had applied the universal law of balance in interpreting religious teachings, the world could have prevented not only poverty and war but also the destructive consequences of religious extremism and dogma. -/- The Role of Correct Information in Decision-Making and the Misinterpretation of Religious Teachings -/- A major reason why poverty, war, and inequality persist is because societies have made decisions based on false, incomplete, or manipulated information. This is especially true in religion, where followers often misinterpret sacred texts to serve their own interests. Instead of following the true wisdom of religious founders, many religious leaders and followers have: -/- 1. Used scripture to justify oppression and discrimination → Even though the original religious figures preached equality and compassion, followers have twisted their words to promote sexism, racism, and class divisions. -/- 2. Blocked scientific progress → Some religious groups have resisted new discoveries because they mistakenly believe these contradict their scriptures. -/- 3. Promoted violence in the name of religion → While most religious founders preached peace, their teachings have been misused to justify wars, crusades, and acts of terrorism. -/- 4. Created economic injustice → Some religious institutions accumulate wealth and power while their followers remain poor, violating the moral principles of their own faith. -/- 5. Suppressed education and critical thinking → Many religious movements have discouraged questioning even when evidence contradicts traditional beliefs. -/- If religious followers had correctly interpreted their holy books through the lens of balance, reason, and universal ethics, many historical conflicts and injustices could have been prevented. -/- How Misinterpretation of Religious Teachings Leads to Imbalances That Cause Poverty, Conflict, and War -/- 1. Economic Imbalance: Religious Dogma Justifies Wealth Inequality -/- Flawed Interpretation: Some religious followers have claimed that wealth is a sign of divine favor, allowing religious institutions and elites to accumulate extreme wealth while keeping followers poor. -/- Effect: Economic inequality leads to mass poverty and social unrest. -/- Example: The Catholic Church in medieval Europe amassed enormous wealth while peasants suffered under a feudal system, leading to revolts like the Protestant Reformation (1517). -/- True Teaching: Jesus Christ preached humility and care for the poor, yet many Christian leaders built lavish palaces and charged the poor for religious services. -/- 2. Resource Imbalance: Religious Wars Over Land and Holy Sites -/- Flawed Interpretation: Some followers believe that their religion grants them exclusive rights over certain lands, leading to violent conflicts. -/- Effect: Wars, ethnic cleansing, and mass displacement of populations. -/- Example: The Israeli-Palestinian conflict is fueled by religious claims over land, causing decades of suffering. -/- True Teaching: Prophets from both Judaism and Islam emphasized justice and peace, yet their followers fight over holy sites instead of coexisting peacefully. -/- 3. Population Imbalance: Opposition to Birth Control Causes Overpopulation -/- Flawed Interpretation: Some religious leaders claim that contraception is against God’s will, leading to uncontrolled population growth in poor countries. -/- Effect: Overpopulation strains resources, causing poverty, unemployment, and hunger. -/- Example: The Catholic Church opposed birth control in the Philippines, contributing to extreme poverty and slum overcrowding. -/- True Teaching: Jesus and Muhammad both emphasized responsibility and caring for one’s family, which would logically include planning for sustainable family sizes. -/- 4. Educational Imbalance: Religious Suppression of Knowledge Slows Progress -/- Flawed Interpretation: Some religious groups believe that questioning religious texts is sinful, preventing scientific discovery. -/- Effect: Societies remain ignorant, uneducated, and technologically behind. -/- Example: The Catholic Church banned Galileo’s heliocentric model, delaying the progress of astronomy. -/- True Teaching: The Quran and the Bible both encourage seeking knowledge, but many followers have rejected modern science. -/- 5. Religious Conflicts and Wars: Justification of Violence in the Name of God -/- Flawed Interpretation: Some extremists believe that holy war is necessary to defend their faith, leading to centuries of religious violence. -/- Effect: Millions of people killed in religious conflicts throughout history. -/- Example: The Crusades (1095-1291) were wars between Christians and Muslims over the Holy Land, causing immense suffering. -/- True Teaching: Jesus and Muhammad both taught that war should only be a last resort for self-defense, not for conquest. -/- 6. Political Imbalance: Religious Control of Governments Leads to Oppression -/- Flawed Interpretation: Some believe that governments should be ruled by religious laws, leading to oppressive theocracies. -/- Effect: Suppression of freedom, human rights violations, and authoritarian rule. -/- Example: Iran’s Islamic Revolution (1979) led to a theocratic government that limits women’s rights and free speech. -/- True Teaching: The Prophet Muhammad and Moses both acted as leaders of justice, not as dictators imposing harsh religious law. -/- 7. Labor Imbalance: Religious Justification of Slavery and Exploitation -/- Flawed Interpretation: Some religious texts were misused to justify slavery and forced labor. -/- Effect: Exploitation, generational poverty, and racial oppression. -/- Example: The Atlantic slave trade was justified using Christian teachings, keeping millions in brutal conditions. -/- True Teaching: Many religious leaders, including Moses, fought against oppression, yet their followers used scripture to do the opposite. -/- How the Universal Law of Balance Could Have Prevented Religious Misinterpretation and Its Consequences -/- If humanity had applied the universal law of balance, societies would have: -/- 1. Interpreted religious texts through reason, ethics, and balance instead of blind obedience. -/- 2. Separated religious teachings from governance and law to ensure fairness for all. -/- 3. Prioritized education and scientific knowledge while respecting religious faith. -/- 4. Prevented religious wars by promoting tolerance and coexistence. -/- 5. Encouraged responsible population planning instead of strict opposition to contraception. -/- 6. Fought against economic and social inequality instead of justifying it through religion. -/- Conclusion -/- Poverty, war, and inequality are not caused by religion itself, but by the flawed interpretation of religious teachings by followers. Had humanity followed the universal law of balance, religious principles would have been applied with wisdom, reason, and fairness, creating a world with economic justice, scientific progress, and peaceful coexistence. The past cannot be changed, but the future can still be reshaped by prioritizing truth, reason, and balance. Only by rejecting dogmatic extremism and restoring balance can we create a world free from poverty, conflict, and oppression. -/- . (shrink)

William Whewell’s 19th-century views are seldom given a prominent place in the history of the philosophy of science. There is, however, a key feature of his account that is, upon historical analysis, prescient of later developments, notably in pragmatism. Whewell calls this the “fundamental antithesis of philosophy”, which centres around the idea that there is no clear demarcation between subject and object (between mind and world or theory and fact). In this paper, I trace this notion’s genealogy. It originated with (...) Kant, who influenced Whewell. Whewell then developed it into a detailed thesis, one that influenced Peirce. It is identifiable in Quine, then (middle) Putnam, and now Cheryl Misak and Steven Levine (aka the new pragmatists). The purpose is to identify a previously overlooked lineage of influence running through the history of philosophy. Whewell’s antithesis might also offer a way to resist both the relativism that tends to accompany post-modern styles of pragmatism and the pretensions to a God’s-eye view latent in analytic metaphysics. (shrink)

In cloud secure personal data sharing is the important issues because it creates several securities and data confidentiality problem while accessing the cloud services. Many challenges present in personal data sharing such as data privacy protection, flexible data sharing, efficient authority delegation, computation efficiency optimization, are remaining toward achieving practical fine-grained access control in the Personal Health Information Sharing system. Personal health records must be encrypted to protect privacy before outsourcing to the cloud. Aiming at solving the above challenges, here (...) propose an efficient data sharing mechanism for Personal Data Sharing, which not only achieves data privacy, fine-grained access control and authority delegation simultaneously, but also optimizes the computation efficiency and is suitable for resource constrained servers. Most of the data consumers are honest, while few of them are corrupt and will leakage their secret keys in the collusion. On the contrary, PKG and data owner are assumed to be fully trusted. Besides, public cloud 1 and public cloud 2 cannot collude with each other. The non-collusive assumption is reasonable, because the client can demand that two cloud servers cannot reveal users’ information by contract. In proposed work, PR-ABE (Attribute Based Encryption with Proxy Re-encryption) technique implements to provide secure encryption of medical data. To improve the access control, here partial key sharing scheme will be implement. Using this, data owner can send partial secret key for the requested user. This approach overcomes the key guessing attack in data retrieval process. (shrink)

Kant's comments on animal minds have provoked radically different readings, with some contending animals have clear and distinct awareness of their world and others contending animals lack consciousness altogether. This paper argues that Kant's comments have received such divergent responses because, according to Kant, we inevitably slide into a deceptive anthropomorphism when talking about non-human minds. While Kant follows contemporaries, such as H.S. Reimarus, in arguing humans can only conceive of animal minds by analogy with their own, Kant's transcendental idealism (...) shifts the meaning of this analogy. The upshot is that animal minds, just like the mind of God, are intrinsically unimaginable for humans. We can talk about them, but it is mere talk; we cannot know what we are talking about. (shrink)

G. E. Moore argued that goodness is not identical to any natural properties on the basis of the Open Question Argument. John Duns Scotus agrees, and for the same reason, at least with respect to transcendental being and goodness. Because it is not a “useless repetition” to say that being is goodness, or vice versa, they are not simply identical. Thus, Scotus rejects run-of-the-mill naturalism and avoids Moore's naturalistic fallacy. However, Scotus holds that “being is goodness,” and vice versa. He (...) therefore denies Moore's ultimate conclusion that goodness is independent of anything properly described under non-evaluative descriptions. (shrink)

Michael Della Rocca has claimed that using intuitions expressed in everyday language for philosophical purposes leads to a “taming of philosophy.” The present article uses an aspect of Christian Wolff's arguments from common notions as a test case for this claim. It is argued that arguments from common linguistic usage in Wolff's analysis of imputation allow for reasoned choices between competing philosophical theories and provide insights into aspects of social reality that are expressed in common notions. This is so because (...) Wolff does not analyze everyday concepts one by one but rather explores their mutual connections. (shrink)

Se trata aquí de hablar de patologías, de sintomática, de un «afuera» de lo normativo. Se trata de lo extraño, del trastorno, de lo afectivo. Se trata aquí del rasgo manifiesto de lo externo cuando penetra en un presunto cosmos cerrado que, sin embargo, tiene infinidad de fugas. Se trata del decir de todo ello. Se trata del silencio acerca de eso mismo, a veces forzado. Porque se trata de la imposibilidad de expresarse, de decir, no del autor que aquí (...) trata de poner en palabras aquello mismo que está cuestionando, sino que lo áfono adviene cuando se trata de establecer en un diálogo con el otro (o los otros) algo acerca del temple anímico que, en un determinado momento, incluso con la ocasión de dicho diálogo mismo, afecta al «hablante». Cuando adviene el silencio, cuando la palabra no se materializa, sin embargo, no significa que no se diga nada, sino que tal callar ya apunta hacia algo, tal vez, no explícito, pero que, no obstante, late sintomáticamente como sentido último del malestar que provoca lo extraño al irrumpir en lo preceptivo. ---- It is a question here of speaking of pathologies, of symptomatology, of an "outside" of the normative. It is about the strange, the disorder, the affective. It is about the manifest trait of the external when it penetrates a supposedly closed cosmos which, nevertheless, has an infinite number of leaks. It is about the telling of it all. It is about the silence about it, sometimes forced. Because it is about the impossibility of expressing oneself, of saying, not of the author who here tries to put into words the very thing he is questioning, but the aphotic comes when one tries to establish in a dialogue with the other (or the others) something about the mental temper that, at a certain moment, even on the occasion of this dialogue itself, affects the "speaker". When silence occurs, when the word does not materialise, it does not mean, however, that nothing is said, but that this silence already points to something, perhaps not explicit, but which nevertheless beats symptomatically as the ultimate meaning of the discomfort caused by the stranger breaking into the prescriptive. (shrink)

Inventing Knowledge: A Global & Historical Introduction to Philosophy is an open educational resource (OER) textbook designed for a cross-cultural historical-survey style Introduction to Philosophy course. While it was written with an undergraduate academic audience in mind, it should also be suitable for self-guided readers interested in philosophy. It covers ‘western' philosophy from the Presocratics of Ancient Greece through to the present day (and including the Islamic world). It also contains additional chapters on philosophy in India, China, Mesoamerica, and Africa. (...) The text touches on issues concerning, but not limited to, metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, political philosophy, philosophy of religion, and aesthetics. Upon working through the material covered here, students should be able to identify and discuss many of the central figures, concepts, problems, theories, and schools of philosophy across history and across the world. (shrink)

In this paper, I survey one of the key arguments used in Latin medieval psychology in favour of active views of cognition, from Peter John Olivi to Durand of St. Pourҁain. In broad terms, these ‘attribution arguments’, based on some appeal to other causal events or how we speak of them, argue that passive views of cognition have the absurd consequence that they misattribute our cognitive acts to things ultimately external to our intrinsic cognitive powers (viz., external objects or sensible/intelligible (...) species). In the secondary literature, these arguments tend to get overshadowed by arguments with more distinctly Augustinian roots, based on the nobility of cognition or the experience of active attention. However, in this paper I argue that these ‘attribution arguments’ are distinctly interesting, especially insofar as they speak to hot debates concerning so-called ‘immanent acts’ and how to read Aristotle on such actions in Metaphysics Θ. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is twofold. One is to show that Aristotle’s study of examples in Prior Analytics (An. Pr.) and Rhetoric (Rh.) (and in particular the ‘comparison’ (parabole) described in Rh 2.20) is useful for philosophy and, moreover, it underlies Aristotle’s discussion of examples in several passages of his philosophical writings. The second is to show that in order to correctly understand the examples that Aristotle presents in his philosophical writings, it is crucial for the reader to successfully (...) identify their logical structure (a task made difficult by the heterogeneous structures covered by Aristotelian examples) and, in the case of comparisons, to identify the relevant features of the illustration presented within its context of use. (shrink)

A alegoria da caverna sob novas perspectivas: Platão, o “revolucionário,” o “rebelde,” o “subversivo” ou “uma proposta de revolta social platônica?” -/- The allegory of the cave from new perspectives: Plato, the “revolutionary,” the “rebel,” the “subversive” or “a proposal for a Platonic social revolt?” -/- La alegoría de la caverna desde nuevas perspectivas: Platón, ¿el «revolucionario», el «rebelde», el «subversivo» o «una propuesta de revuelta social platónica»? -/- Resumo: Muito se tem refletido e discorrido sobre Platão e suas obras. (...) Uma delas em específico seria A República e o texto do livro sete onde se encontra “a famosa ou clássica” alegoria da caverna. Através e por meio de novas abordagens da filosofia, sociologia, antropologia, historiografia e dentre outras áreas – visamos extrair novos conteúdos e reflexões em tal obra e alegoria. E assim encontramos indícios que apontam para um Platão não conservador – como alguns defendem, mas sim para um filósofo empenhado e militante pelas e nas transformações e mudanças sociais, talvez um subversivo, rebelde ou beirando a um tipo de revolucionário da época e contextos – isso por meio da prática filosófica e seus elementos, características e marcas com os instrumentos ou ferramentas da ironia, da dúvida e da crítica. O que causaram bastantes problemas para alguns teóricos e filósofos da Grécia antiga, bem como especificamente na Atenas. A exemplo: Sócrates. Que pondo em prática tal filosofia, tão logo foi perseguido, condenado, sentenciado e morto. Fatos que influenciaram muito a Platão, sua consciência e filosofia, talvez uma proposta subversiva, revolucionária ou uma proposta de revolta social platônica. Palavras-chave: Platão; Filosofia e consciência; A República; Alegoria da Caverna; Revolução Platônica; Transformação Social. (shrink)