Among the many works that Vedānta Deśikaṉ—(traditional dates: 1268-1369), a most eminent theologian of all times—composed in his lifetime, his minor works—thirty in number and collectively known as the _Cillaṟai rahasyam_ (‘miscellaneous esoterica’)—stand out like guides meant to help those eager Śrīvaiṣṇavas who lack time to deepen their knowledge of Viśiṣṭādvaita by the study of longer and deeper texts. One such _rahasyam_ is the _Upakārasaṅgraham_, in which Deśikaṉ deals (almost exhaustively) with the theme of God’s countless acts of _upakāra_ (‘aid, (...) help, favour’) upon the individual souls. This beneficence of God’s forms the very basis of Viśiṣṭādvaita, as it involves a discussion of one the three _tattvas_ (‘realities’), namely, God, (and by extension, the sentient entity), as well as on _mokṣa_ (‘liberation’), which is the ultimate aim of the Śrīvaiṣṇava Ācāryas. In this article, which is ultimately meant to introduce to the reader an important but little-known text, I shall explore the topic of infinite divine _upakāra_ as elaborated upon by Vedānta Deśikaṉ in his _Upakārasaṅgraham_, which, according to this text, ought to inspire human gratitude. And in the process, we shall also examine the nature and object(s) of God’s acts of _upakāra_, and the means through which He proceeds to bestow them. (shrink)

Ignorance becomes a philosophical issue when it is first-personal, i.e., _x_’s awareness about _x_’s own ignorance. It raises exciting and apparently paradoxical questions about cognition. Keeping first-personal experience of ignorance at the centre, some Indian philosophical schools discuss extensively the nature of ignorance. Vyāsatīrtha from the Dualist school (Dvaita Vedānta), along with the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school propound that ignorance belongs to a negative category (_abhāvapadārtha_) or in other words, that it must be understood as an absence of some cognition. The Non-dualist (...) school (Advaita Vedānta) thinks that ignorance is not an absence of cognition, but a positive entity (_bhāvarūpa_) that obstructs our cognition. The first group objects for considering ignorance as a positive entity arguing that it leads to the problem of profligacy of ontological entities, whereas the Non-dualists argue that considering ignorance as an absence of cognition leads to contradictions in cases of first-personal experiences of ignorance. In this paper, I present a small segment of the extensive arguments from both sides, alongside two Western philosophical theories that support the views of the Dualists and the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika. Through a critical analysis of these arguments, I demonstrate that, with respect to the specific set of arguments examined, the view of ignorance as an absence of cognition fails to sufficiently account for cases of first-personal experiences of ignorance. In contrast, the Non-dualist conceptualization proves more robust, given its successful applicability to all instances of ignorance. (shrink)

Inductive inference faces the problem of induction, while Nyāya inference confronts Cārvāka objections. It has been generally agreed that the problem of induction is essentially similar to the Cārvāka objections against the validity of Nyāya inference. In this article, I will endeavor to refute this claim. The objections Cārvāka raised against inference, I shall argue, do not construe the problem of induction. I will analyze Udayana and Mādhavācārya's works on Cārvāka objections against inference to support my claim. Following Udayanācārya, I (...) will distinguish between naive and sophisticated versions of the Cārvāka attack on inference and try to show that neither version of the Cārvāka objection poses the problem of induction. I will also examine Mādhava's formulation of Cārvāka objection to support the same. Moreover, a detailed analysis and interpretation of Udayanācārya's replies to the Cārvāka objections against inference will be presented. I will conclude the paper by showing that Udayanācārya's replies also do not constitute a solution to the problem of induction. (shrink)

The paper covers a topic that sits between theology and philosophy of language and is based on completely unpublished material. The bulk of the paper consists in the critical edition and annotated translation of a section of an unpublished and anonymous commentary on the _Ratnatrayaparīkṣā_ by Śrīkaṇṭha. This section describes the transition of the indeterminate knowledge to the determined one according to the early Śaiva Siddhānta perspective. The introduction contains parts that are more “philological” or “historical” and others that are (...) more “philosophical”. The paper contains one appendix on the significant variant readings of the _mūla_ text. (shrink)

This paper deals with the debates over _kālamṛtyu_ (“timely death” or human death at the end of the life span) and _akālamṛtyu_ (“untimely death” or premature death that occurs when the life span still remains). In cultural areas like ancient India, where the _karman_ doctrine or the law of _karman_ is firmly rooted, such “timely death” and “untimely death” have seemed to be the catalysts for the philosophical and ethical debates. Assuming that a person’s life itself would be affected by (...) the person’s past _karman_s, each life span and death of individual persons would have been predetermined by their past _karman_s, and consequently, any efforts for preserving or prolonging life span in this world would have no meaning. If it were so, in the first place, does the _karman_ doctrine leave room for “untimely death”? This paper discusses how Buddhist literature, especially the _Questions of King Milinda_ (_Milindapañha_), and the Āyurvedic literature approach the above issues. (shrink)

One debate that occupied Pratyabhijñā philosophers and their Buddhist interlocutors was the question of the reality of _sambandha_, or relation. A central treatise on the topic is Utpaladeva’s (∼10th c.) _Sambandhasiddhi_ [SS] (‘_Proof of Relation_’), a response to Dharmakīrti’s (∼7th c.) _Sambandhaparīkṣā_ [SP] (‘_Analysis of Relation_’). As the contrasting titles suggest, Dharmakīrti held that relations are merely conceptual constructions (_kalpanā_), inferred _post hoc_ from discrete perceptual cognitions (_pratyakṣa_)—and thus ultimately _unreal_. Utpaladeva, on the other hand, attempted to ‘prove’ (_siddhi_) the (...) truth (_satya_) of relation as a genuine ‘division-non-division,’ or ‘unity-in-diversity’ (_bhedābheda_). In this article, I reconstruct Utpala’s ‘proof’ as a pragmatic argument to the effect that Dharmakīrti, in virtue of his nominalist metaphysics, mistakenly treats the general form of relation as an inferential _concept_, rather than the mode of ‘intentional’ _action_ (_śakti_) manifest in reflexive judgment (_vimarśa_). In doing so, Utpala suggests that Dharmakīrti inadvertently renders the relational conditions for the recognition of determinate intentional content unintelligible. (shrink)

The traditional Buddhist Sanskrit term _vijñāna_ cannot be given the meaning “consciousness” in accordance with the grammatical rules of Pāṇini’s _Aṣṭādhyāyī_. In Vedic texts the traditional Sanskrit terms _citta_ and _manas_ refer to the eternal cognitive entities, which were also popular in some Indian Prakrit languages at the time of Buddha. It seems possible that Buddha himself created the new Prakrit term to denote the impermanent cognitive apparatus, which is produced by object and sensory organ. The sound of the Prakrit (...) term is recorded and written as _vijñāna_ with Sanskrit letters. In the case of a hypothetical debate between a Buddhist and a Brahmanist, the Brahmanist would insist on strictly following Sanskrit Grammar in order to interpret the Sanskrit word _vijñāna_. Discrepancies arising from the non-native usage of this term would lead to a great many mistakes and cause debates to become impossible. Vasubandhu, therefore, introduced a new Sanskrit term _vijñapti_ to refer to consciousness and remedy this confusion. Through the analysis presented in Pāṇini’s _Aṣṭādhyāyī_, we find that the root of _vijñapti_ is not _jñā_ as some scholars have said, but _jñap._ Although _vijñapti_ looks like a substantive thing, it is just a momentary aggregation of cognitive efficacies (_vyāpṛti_) without any ontic base. Therefore, the new term _vijñapti_ can not only be translated as consciousness, but it is also in conformity with the Mahāyāna doctrines of _anityatā_, _niḥsvabhāvatā_ and _śūnyatā_ well. (shrink)

The current study aims to clarify the meaning, the epistemic construction, and the pragmatics of the term _āgama_ occurring in _Pātañjalayogaśāstra_ I.7 and its commentaries. Since _āgama_ is a linguistic construction, this paper is also a contribution to the inquiry into the philosophy of language of the _Pātañjalayogaśāstra_. The inclusion of linguistic-philosophical arguments corroborates the Pātañjalayoga system of philosophy as a _śāstra_ text and its logical and epistemological paradigm. The structure of the present work is as follows: a first part (...) strictly dealing with textual sources, and a second where the content of textual sources is discussed. Relying on the early literature ranging from the _Pātañjalayogaśāstra_ (c. 400 CE) to the _Pātañjalayogasūtravṛtti_ of Nāgeśa Bhaṭṭa (PYV, half of 17th—half of 18th cent. CE), to _āgama_ can be accorded two principal meanings: as a generic verbal testimony, and as authoritative verbal teachings. Grounded on the evaluated textual material, the second part of this essay presents a hypothesis aiming at the understanding of verbal testimony: in the _Pātañjalayogaśāstra_, _āgama_ exhibits an epistemological, linguistic and psychological construction. In fact, as an epistemic theory of verbal testimony _āgama_ functions following three main vectors being: (a) epistemological source and instance of valid cognition, namely a _pramāṇa_, (b) linguistically structured, _āgama_ exhibits a propositional structure (_vākya_); and (c) a mental episode, placing _āgama_ as one among the different mental events (_cittavṛtti_) described in the _Pātañjalayogaśāstra_. (shrink)

This article provides an annotated English translation and edition of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of Bhāviveka’s (490/500-570) _Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā_ 3.129cd-136 and of the Tibetan text of the _Tarkajvālā_ thereon, which focus on the discussion of unconditioned entities (_asaṃskṛta_). The study is accompanied by an introduction that outlines the general themes of the third chapter, the specific topics within the examined section and various problematic aspects found in the _Tarkajvālā_ exposition of Buddhist (Vaibhāṣika, Yogācāra) and non-Buddhist (Vaiśeṣika, Jain) doctrines and philosophies. (...) The multitude of inaccuracies detected within the examined _Tarkajvālā_ section cast doubt on its authenticity as a genuine work of Bhāviveka. It is hypothesized that the author of at least this portion of the _Tarkajvālā_ might have been a young student who struggled to recall the fundamental doctrines of the schools he attempts to elucidate. (shrink)

This article provides an annotated English translation and edition of the Sanskrit and Tibetan texts of Bhāviveka’s (490/500-570) _Madhyamakahṛdayakārikā_ 3.129cd-136 and of the Tibetan text of the _Tarkajvālā_ thereon, which focus on the discussion of unconditioned entities (_asaṃskṛta_). The study is accompanied by an introduction that outlines the general themes of the third chapter, the specific topics within the examined section and various problematic aspects found in the _Tarkajvālā_ exposition of Buddhist (Vaibhāṣika, Yogācāra) and non-Buddhist (Vaiśeṣika, Jain) doctrines and philosophies. (...) The multitude of inaccuracies detected within the examined _Tarkajvālā_ section cast doubt on its authenticity as a genuine work of Bhāviveka. It is hypothesized that the author of at least this portion of the _Tarkajvālā_ might have been a young student who struggled to recall the fundamental doctrines of the schools he attempts to elucidate. (shrink)

This paper focuses on Sāṃkhya-Yoga and Buddhist Abhidharma ontologies and their engagement. A close reading of two hitherto uncompared passages from _Pātañjalayogaśāstra_ 2.13 and Vasubandhu’s _Abhidharmakośabhāṣya_ 4.94 suggests that they are intertextual or interdiscursive. A mirrored argument form in the texts explains ethical causality (karma) in relation to rebirth (_punarjanman_). The arguments in both texts are similar in form, sequence, and even conclusion, although not in terms of the doctrinal basis of reasoning. On first examination, both arguments analyse how action (...) (karma) sustains patterns of moral repercussion across life and beyond death in terms of singular and plural causes and effects. But a close reading shows that the level of conceptual engagement on this issue is more nuanced – centred on ‘projecting’ and ‘completing’ mechanisms of karmic retribution (_ākṣepaka karman_ and _paripūraka karman_) as well as determinate or indeterminate (_niyata_ and _aniyata_) maturation of karmic effects. The paper suggests that the function of Patañjali’s passage was to serve as a structured engagement with Buddhist Sarvāstivāda karma theory. (shrink)

Haṭhayoga texts, influential in the development of modern posture-based yoga, offer a conceptual framework intertwining physical cultivation, health, and soteriological aims. This article explores two interconnected inquiries regarding early Haṭhayoga texts: How do they conceptualize health, and how do they perceive the relationship between health and soteriology? These investigations illuminate the place of health in early yoga texts within Hindu traditions prior to its global recognition. This article reveals that early _haṭha_ texts present a holistic approach to health, highlighting the (...) interconnectedness of curing the mind and healing the body. This process entails not only eradicating physical diseases but also the transcendence of all forms of suffering. The transformative process of eliminating the misleading self-identity (_ahaṁkāra_) is pivotal, leading directly to health. This relationship extends beyond metaphorical comparisons of healing ignorance and suffering. This ontological framework proposes a harmonious integration between the material and soteriological realms, viewing the healthy body as a physical manifestation of the divine essence. Thus, the emergence of the biomedical discourse surrounding yoga in modern times did not occur autonomously. Haṭhayoga, with its roots dating back to the beginning of the second millennium CE, played a crucial role in shaping this historical transformation. (shrink)

In our study of the development of Buddhist ideas over time, one of the major problems is the absence of the links, connecting different strata, strands or schools of the Buddhist thought. Perhaps, the most extreme example of this is the origin of the Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda tradition, a complex teaching that emerged almost “full-grown” in the _Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra_. Our knowledge of the historical antecedents of Yogācāra is very scarce and, what concerns the school Sautrāntika/Dārṣṭāntika, contradictory. The _Māyājāla-sūtra_ very likely reveals important details (...) regarding the very origin of the Yogācāra tradition and is, therefore, a long-sought- for source. _Māyājāla-sūtra_ is a _sūtra_ in the recently recovered Sanskrit _Dīrgha-āgama_. It stands out from the other _Dīrgha-āgama sūtras_ by its diction and unique compositional and doctrinal features. One of its unique features is that its core terminology, its passages and similes are used extensively in the Sautrāntika-Dārṣṭāntika-Yogācāra sources, especially in the _Yogācārabhūmi_ and the _Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra_. In the article, I summarize the _sūtra_, overview these features and show that the central message of the _sūtra_ is the so-called _darśana-mārga_, a path of seeing, which is accompanied by supramundane insight (lokottara-prajñā), which enables a Buddhist adept to directly perceive the true reality and become an _ārya_, noble person. I argue that this central idea of the _sūtra_ is textually and doctrinally (or philosophically) interwoven with the specifically Yogācāra understanding of the _darśana-mārga_. Moreover, I show that one of the main ideas of the _sūtra_, the ambivalence of the sense objects, realized at the _darśana-mārga_, is likely an antecedent of the specifically Yogācāra teaching on the possibility of the same object to cause opposite types of experience, and, as such, an antecedent of the cornerstone Yogācāra principle of _vijñaptimātratā_ (the teaching that the objects of perception are mere representations of/in the mind). Another important aspect explored in this paper is the intertextuality of the _Māyājāla-sūtra_, its parallels and the first chapters of the _Saṃdhinirmocana-sūtra_, which sheds important light on the origin of the latter text. I argue that these parallels to the Yogācāra teachings are, at the very least, their earlier precedents, and, because of that the _Māyājāla-sūtra_ may be called a proto-Yogācāra _sūtra_. (shrink)

This article discusses the unique practice of many philosophers in classical India to write on several philosophical and religious systems, each time adopting a sympathetic point of view for a different tradition. The article describes the development of this phenomenon in the context of interreligious debates between Buddhists, Jains, and Brahmins in the course of three distinct historical periods, transitioning from pluralism about views to pluralism about philosophical systems and culminating in the ideal of _sarva-tantra-sva-tantra_, a polyvocal philosopher and a (...) polymath. Contrary to such approaches as nihilism, agnosticism, skepticism, and dogmatism, pluralism about views and systems was an attempt to justify the acceptance of several competing schools of thought. The article demonstrates that varieties of pluralism about views and systems played a role in forming and broadening philosophical alliances to defeat religious rivals, but also enhanced the scholarly reputation of erudite thinkers capable of “proving and refuting any system by will.”. (shrink)

Comparing the _kāraka_ theory as presented in Pāṇiniʼs (_ca_. fifth-fourth century BC) and Candragominʼs (_ca_. fifth century AD) systems of grammar, Joshi and Roodbergen observed that in the _Cāndrasūtra_, the heading rule Pāṇ 2.3.1 (_anabhihite_), which plays an important role for all the _kāraka_ rules, is missing. Deshpande, however, criticized their understanding. According to him, Patañjali (_ca_. second century BC), in his _Mahābhāṣya_, already dealt with the question of whether the general principle _uktārthānām aprayogaḥ_ can justify the omission of this (...) heading rule; under the influence of Patañjali, Candragomin took the position that it is not necessary to explicitly provide Pāṇ 2.3.1. The present paper revisits this issue on the basis of some newly edited Cāndra materials, the _Cāndrapañjikā_ and the _Śabdārthacintā_, which were both written by the eminent Sinhalese grammarian Ratnamati or Ratnaśrījñāna (_ca_. tenth century AD). Ratna’s detailed explanation not only confirms that Deshpande’s assumption is correct, but it also clarifies that the problem pointed out by Pāṇinians in the case of the omission of Pāṇ 2.3.1 can be solved by resorting to the theory of the fivefold meaning of a nominal stem. (shrink)

The critical analysis of desire is a staple of classical Buddhist thought; however, modern scholarship has focused primarily on doctrinal and scholastic texts that explain the Buddhist understanding of desire. As a result, the contribution of _kāvya_ (poetry) to the classical Buddhist philosophy of desire has not received much scholarly attention. To address this dearth, I explore in this article the notion of _kāma_ (desire or love) in Aśvaghoṣa’s epic poem, the _Saundarananda_ (_Beautiful Nanda_). I begin by framing the poem’s (...) Buddhist interpretation of desire and highlighting the didactic and transcendental role of _kāma_ in transforming Nanda, the poem’s protagonist. Then, I examine Aśvaghoṣa’s poetic depictions of Nanda, Sundarī, and the _apsaras_es, outlining the _Saundarananda_’s phenomenology of desire. Overall, this article illustrates how Aśvaghoṣa employs the genre of _kāvya_ to express a Buddhist critique of desire that focuses on the nature of the desirable object and the state of mind of the desirous subject. (shrink)

The Old Nyāya believes that a cause has a causal power of some kind, and it is possible to have valid cognition of a causal event. But Nāgārjuna (2nd century) challenged the very idea of causality. Also, he attacked the concept of epistemic instruments (_pramāṇa_). Śrīharṣa (12th century) too found counterexamples to the Nyāya definition of valid cognition. These attacks raised fundamental questions about the Naiyāyika’s take on the validity of causal statements. In 14 th century, Gaṅgeśa defended the Nyāya (...) theories of causality by shifting the starting point, and redefined causality. He completely bypassed the ontological issues raised by Nāgārjuna, and sought to answer an epistemic question: Is the knowledge about a causal event possible? In this essay, I shall critically examine his answer. He adopted the Old Nyāya view that a valid cognition leads one to pragmatic success, and stated that all pragmatically successful cognitions about causal events were valid. But he was aware of the fact that success could also be accidental. His ‘inferential defeater’ has the potential to rule out cases of accidental success or epistemic luck in the inferential context, although his definition of valid cognition seems to apply to those. In this essay, I shall formulate a definition of ‘epistemic defeater’ by modifying Gaṅgeśa’s definition of ‘inferential defeater’, and shall use the new concept for modifying Gaṅgeśa’s definition of valid cognition. This modified definition of valid cognition—I shall argue—will be able to rule out most of the problematic cases cited by Śrīharṣa. (shrink)

This article will critically examine the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika theory of substance (_dravya_). The Buddhists are reductionists, who believe that there is no substance over and above its attributes (_guṇa_) or parts (_avayava_). Thus, a pot is a set of a certain shape, size, color, texture, etc. But the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika philosopher thinks that a pot is a substance that houses all of its attributes and actions (_karman_). It holds all these together. Also, it binds its parts. Although the Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika school defines a (...) substance, it does not seem to offer any theory of the diachronic identity of a substance; it does not discuss a Theseus’-ship-like case. In this article we shall offer a theory of diachronic identity of a substance based on a Nyāya-Vaiśeṣika definition of substance. (shrink)

This essay is one more attempt of understanding the non-dual philosophical position of Abhinavagupta viz-a-viz the problem of reflection. Since when my first essay on ‘Abhinavagupta on Reflection’ appeared in JIP, I have once again focused on the non-dual Śaiva theory of reflection (_pratibimbavāda_) (3.1-65) as discussed by Abhinavagupta (_fl.c._ 975-1025 CE) in the _Tantrāloka_ and his commentator Jayaratha (_fl.c._ 1225-1275 CE). The present attempt is to understand their philosophical position in the context of Nyāya realism where a reflection is (...) simply caused by an erroneous apprehension of an entity. For Naiyāyikas, according to both Abhinavagupta and Jayaratha, a reflection (_pratibimba_) does not have a real existence at all. There are only two ways of looking at a reflection: it can either simply be an original image (_bimba_) or an illusion (_bhrānti_). There is no scope for any third entity apart from something being an error or a non-error. In contrast to this, establishing a Śaiva theory of reflection, Abhinavagupta is corroborating a valid ontological status for the seemingly illusory objects of perception or imagined objects, such as, to use Abhinavagupta’s own language, ‘an elephant with five trunks and four tusks who is running in the sky’. In other words, he is pleading for the valid cognition of objects which are otherwise deemed to be an error or external to consciousness. While Abhinavagupta’s system has generally been referred to as ‘idealism’, I argue that by establishing the dynamism of reflective awareness that is deemed to be absolutely real, his system should be referred to as ‘dynamic realism’ i.e., the ‘dynamism’ that is common to both ‘real’ and ‘ideal’. This is why he uses the metaphor _consciousness-as-mirror_ (_ciddarpaṇa_) in establishing a non-erroneous ontological status for otherwise illusive idea of reflection. (shrink)

As one of the most pivotal thinkers in the history Mahāyāna Buddhism, the writings of Nāgārjuna have long attracted the attention of scholars aiming to interpret in declarative terms the meaning of the arguments contained therein. However, the very aim of such an endeavor that seeks to ascribe to Nāgārjuna a philosophical position is fundamentally at odds with the unwaveringly critical nature of his project. In order to illustrate the singular character of Nāgārjuna’s methodology, this article seeks to clarify three (...) crucial points concerning his thought: (1) the central concept in his philosophical works, dependent origination (_pratītyasamutpāda_), ironically denotes the non-origination (_anutpāda_) of any entity (_bhāva_) whatsoever and is universal in scope; (2) emptiness (_śūnyatā_) is not a meaningful predicate of any entity, meaning that no entity exists that can be identified as being empty; and (3) the Two Truths (_satyadvaya_) are not a philosophically significant device for Nāgārjuna and subsequently do not provide a means by which to mitigate the radical consequences of his arguments. As a result, we can understand Nāgārjuna’s claim to have no postulative thesis (_pratijñā_) as a statement that he predicates no quality (_dharma_) of any subject (_dharmin_), and that his methodology is strictly critical, offering us no constructive theory by which to make sense of reality. (shrink)

The paper attempts to answer a very obstinate fundamental problem—is literary meaning determinable at all? Would it be determinable if it were constructed by the language of the text? Or is this meaning open-ended, constantly deferred or shifted as a result of the very nature of signification? In this paper, I argue that the levels of _dhvani-ṣ Avivakṣitavācya dhvani _ and_ Vivakṣitavācya dhvani_ and their sub-levels are far more comprehensive than the concept of ‘_differance_’, both based on the play of (...) meanings. Ānandvardhana seems to anticipate Derrida in postulating the infinite suggested meaning over and above the expressed literal meaning in the levels of _dhvani_, though the admission of any definite literal meaning itself goes against the deconstructive approach of ‘_differance_’. The paper also deals with the analysing a few literary works with the levels of _dhvani_ and also how meaning of a text is revealed to the _sahrdaya_ (reader). (shrink)

This paper explores how Indic and Indic-derived linguistic analyses of the Buddha’s epithet _bhagavat_ influenced the epithet’s interpretations and translations in the Sanskrit, Pali, Chinese, and Tibetan traditions. The paper consists of three parts. The first part examines and classifies the evidence into four types of analyses that ultimately reflect analytical models afforded by the Indic linguistic disciplines of grammar (_vyākaraṇa_) and etymology (_nirvacana_). The second part explores how these linguistic analyses coordinate with pronouncements emphasizing the epithet’s extraordinary status as (...) opposed to ordinary language terms. The third part examines how these analyses fostered the adoption of certain translations strategies in China and Tibet, focusing on the second of the ‘Five Guidelines for Non-Translating’ (_wǔzhǒng bùfān_ 五種不翻) attributed to Xuanzang (600/602–664) and on pertinent statements recorded in the early-ninth-century Tibetan _Sgra sbyor bam po gñis pa_/_Madhyavyutpatti_. Using _bhagavat_ as an example, this paper aims to demonstrate the important yet little-studied role that Indic and Indic-derived linguistic analyses had in South Asian Buddhism as well as in the Indianized Buddhist cultures of China and Tibet. (shrink)

This article surveys recent work on Vedānta, focusing on English-language secondary scholarship since the year 2000. The article consists of two parts. The first part (published previously) identified trends within recent scholarship, highlighting several promising areas of new research: the social history of Vedānta, Vedānta in the early modern period, vernacular Vedānta, Persian Vedānta, colonial and post-colonial Vedānta, and pedagogy and practice. It also covered edited volumes, special journal issues, and ongoing collaborative research projects. The second part (published here) provides (...) an overview of scholarship on specific schools of Vedānta (Advaita, Viśiṣṭādvaita, Dvaita, etc.), as well as a survey of philosophical, theological, and comparative studies. The article concludes with suggestions for further research. (shrink)

Using logic-laden terms to translate and interpret what the ancient Indian Buddhist thinkers said when we are not sure what they spoke about when they spoke about ‘contradictions’, etc. in natural languages can sometimes make things frustrating. Keeping in mind Wittgenstein’s exhortation, “don’t think, but look!”, I approach the issues of contradiction, negation, and the _catuṣkoṭi_ via case-by-case study on several pertinent passages in Dharmapāla’s _Dasheng Guangbailun Shilun_. The following are some interrelated observations which should not be overgeneralized, especially considering (...) the limited scope of this study and its methodological considerations. First, there is an implicit rule of non-opposition and there could be no real oppositions for apparent oppositions because of implicit qualifications. Moreover, these are not new since or after Dignāga. Second, Dharmapāla and his contemporaries are familiar with the two negative usages, and _prasajya-pratiṣedha_ is used for negating the opponents’ theses and is related to the no-thesis view. It’s not a good idea to assign truth values to sentences using _prasajya-pratiṣedha_ or to a thesis in which the terms have no real objects. And Dharmapāla’s theses are just therapeutic tools. Third, in Dharmapāla’s discussion of the negative _catuṣkoṭi_, one can see the rule of non-opposition, the strategy of qualifications, and the two negative usages. Although the four positions in the _catuṣkoṭi_ are regarded as mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive, they are jointly exhaustive in pragmatic context, and are mutually exclusive under some interpretations, but not all. My tentative suggestion is that the _catuṣkoṭi_ is a loosely term-based way of categorization. Last but not least, in the text discussed, I do not see Buddhist thinkers endorsing any contradictions. (shrink)

The Indian Buddhist Mādhyamika master Candrakīrti (ca. 7th century CE) grounds his philosophy in _lokaprasiddhi_ / -_prasiddha_, “that which is common knowledge / generally accepted among people in the world.” This raises the question of whether Candrakīrti accepts _everything_ that is “common knowledge” or instead distinguishes and privileges certain justifiable beliefs within common knowledge. Tom J.F. Tillemans has argued that Candrakīrti advocates a “lowest common denominator” version of _lokaprasiddhi_ instead of a model which promotes “in some areas at least, more (...) of a qualitative hierarchy of opinions and thus criticism by optimally qualified, insightful individuals.” In this way Candrakīrti is characterized as a “typical Prāsaṅgika” who advocates “a populist _lokaprasiddha_ and global error theory,” leading to “a dismal slough of relativism” in which Candrakīrti is compelled to uncritically acquise in the opinions of “average worldlings.” I argue that Candrakīrti instead employs a version of _lokaprasiddhi_ that distinguishes expert knowledge from the untutored notions of the _hoi polloi_. This argument is based upon a new interpretation of _āgama_ Candrakīrti twice quotes, and Candrakīrti’s usage of the terms _lokaprasiddhi_ / -_prasiddha_, _loka_- / _laukikavyavahāra_, _saṃvṛti_ and _saṃvṛtisatya_, and _laukika paramārtha_. I conclude that Candrakīrti presents himself as an expert in the determination of mundane affairs (_laukikārthaviniścayanipuṇa_), the foremost of which is the “mundane ultimate” (_laukika paramārtha_), the Buddha’s teaching of the path to liberation. Candrakīrti illucidates this for those following “the Victor’s path of reasoning” (_jinasya yuktipathānuyāyin_). He bases his philosophy in a position that is simply mundane (_laukika eva pakṣe sthitvā_), but which is nevertheless rationally demonstrable within the parameters of that which is common knowledge among people in the world (_lokaprasiddhi_). (shrink)

Although the Kaula literature of the Newars did not give rise to a systematic philosophical school like that of their Kashmiri counterparts, I will argue in this article that philosophical thinking can be detected in Newar ritual texts. I do this by translating and analysing the unpublished _Kālīsūtra_, an important hymn found in Newar Uttarāmnāya liturgies whose transmission and composition will also be touched upon. This hymn indicates that the cult of Kālī in Nepal had a distinct ontological stance tending (...) towards a non-dualism which was world-affirming while also seeing consciousness as the ultimate reality. Several key conceptual strands of the _Sūtra_ such as the relationship between transcendence and immanence, reality and cognition and the divine and the body will be elaborated upon. In the process, I will show that the _Kālīsūtra_’s philosophy brings into sharper focus doctrines already present in the canonical Krama and thus displays many affinities with the Pratyabhijñā, a school which shares its cultic backdrop. (shrink)