In recent years the study of well-being has attracted considerable attention, fostering hope that the scientific community will ultimately succeed in discovering its very nature, thereby emulating successful scientific projects in other disciplines. However, there have been recurring worries about how to measure and define well-being. In this context, Hersch (Br J Philos Sci 73:1045–1065, 2022) has recently argued that we could progressively alleviate these worries through an iterative dialogue between theory and measurement, by seeing them as stemming from a (...) coordination problem. In this article, I argue that the concept of well-being fails to meet the prerequisites for Hersch’s approach. If the latter is the best defense of the capacity of science to uncover the nature of well-being, it follows that the science of well-being should probably relinquish this ambition. (shrink)

The selected effects theory is supposed to provide a fully naturalistic basis for statements about what biological traits or processes are for without appeal to final causes or intelligent design. On the selected effects theory, biologists are allowed to say, for instance, that hindwing eyespots on butterfly wings serve to deflect predators’ attacks away from vital organs because a similar fitness-enhancing effect explains why eyespots themselves were favoured by natural selection and persisted in the population. This is known as the (...) explanatory dimension of the selected effects theory. According to it, appealing to the fitness-enhancing effect of a certain trait or process is sufficient to explain its current presence in a population, namely, why it persisted and still exists in that population. In this paper, however, I will call such a claim into question, and I will do so by discussing a mathematical Hawk-Dove example and a real case scenario taken from evolutionary biology, that of Perissodus microlepis. These are scenarios in which the selective filter does not allow variants with the highest fitness at a certain moment to prevail over their available alternatives. In similar cases, I will argue, citing fitness-enhancing effects does not represent an adequate explanation of what happens in the population, undermining the explanatory dimension of the selected effects theory. (shrink)

We revisit John Worrall’s old but still prominent argument against the view that randomization balances the impact of both known and unknown confounders across the treatment and control arms. We argue that his argument involving indefinitely many possible confounders is at odds with statistical theory as it (1) presumes that the purpose of randomized studies is obtaining perfect point estimates for which perfect balance is needed; (2) mistakes equalizing each confounder with the overall (average) impact of all confounders, and (3) (...) assumes that the joint effect of an infinite series of confounders cannot be bounded. We defend the role of randomization in balancing the impact of confounders across the treatment and control arms by putting forward the statistical sense of the balance claim. It involves the following three commitments: (1) randomization balances confounders in expectancy, (2) for RCTs to deliver unbiased estimates of the causal effect (true average treatment effect), the balance in the average effect of all confounders and not balancing each confounder is sufficient, and (3) randomization allows for calculating the probability of deviating from the balance. The paper includes a review of how the balance claim has been understood so far and discusses recent arguments supporting randomization balancing the impact of confounders in expectancy and the crucial role of the average impact of all actual confounders, and shows how statistical analysis of RCTs conducted both at the design and analysis stage makes possible estimating the probabilities of deviating from the balance. (shrink)

The goal of this paper is to explore a set of epistemological and ontological issues regarding the historical and philosophical role of placebos in the contested history of antidepressants. Starting from an account of the dual nature of the placebo as both an epistemic and a therapeutic tool, and against the background of the heated debates on the efficacy of second-generation antidepressants, I propose two related arguments. First, I argue that placebos as controls played a crucial but paradoxical role in (...) the rise of so-called evidence-based approaches to depression. Second, I discuss how current research on placebo effects puts into question some of the most crucial assumptions of psychiatric technoscience regarding the ontology of affective experiences. Ultimately, this paper aims to probe discussions around placebos, placebo effects, and the status of depression both as a diagnostic category and a lived experience. (shrink)