Kathy Wilkes’s essays on explanations and representations, and especially her interaction with Daniel Dennett, raise questions about whether some notion of representation can explain action intention. Wilkes is not sure whether subpersonal representations are real, but she thinks that the most pragmatic strategy is to take the intentional stance and accept the usefulness of personal level intentions, even if we have to worry that this does not give us a scientific explanation. Wilkes’s skepticism about subpersonal representations, and even about the (...) appropriateness of the notion of subpersonal levels of explanation, seems to fit with more recent embodied-enactive approaches to cognition. Considerations about the nature of cognitive mechanisms and animal intelligence prevent her from moving in that direction, however. These insights suggest that Wilkes’ analysis continues to be directly relevant to contemporary discussions. (shrink)

Content externalism and vehicle externalism (what-externalism and how—externalism) or more commonly known as the thesis of extended mind, are said to be two totally independent views that ”diverge sharply” (Stanford encyclopedia). There are advocates, adversaries but also ag nostics about the extended mind thesis. The approach has been much debated and the controversies about vehicle externalism are importantly manifold. I am not going into any of them. My aim is different and fo cused on why and how content externalism is (...) characterized by vehicle externalists. Content externalism is labelled by extended mind theorists as: merely causal, taxonomic (Wilson), reactionary (Rowlands), passive (Clark), while vehicle externalism is: constitutive, radical and active. Since content externalists (to my knowledge) have not reacted to a rather negative presentation of their ideas, I restrict myself to showing that many of vehicle externalist (VE) presented views about content externalism (CE) are partly unjustified, not definitive and even wrong. I zoom on the following: 1. CE being ‘merely’ causal. 2. Active vs. Passive distinc tion, 3. CE being behaviourally inert. (shrink)

Machines can now match, or outperform, human performance in several reasoning and decision tasks. Some say that all that intelligence amounts to is smart computation. This is not a new thesis, dating back to Leibniz as well as Simon and Newell, but what is new is what smart means. Today it is identified with complex statistics and optimisation. Simon’s meaning, however, of smart rested on bounded rationality, a unified view of human and artificial decision making. This view was f l (...) eshed out by Gigerenzer as fast-and-frugal heuristics. Interestingly, such heuristics are typically sparse, as some machine learning models are optimised to be. So, one might hope that we can make sense of artificial intelligence in human terms after all, and face the upcoming challenges with open-mindedness and courage, just like Simon, and of course Wilkes, would have done. (shrink)

In this paper, we propose and defend a theory of concepts. According to Machery (2009), psychologists and philosophers mean different things by ‘concept’. Psychologists mean bodies of knowledge used to categorise and infer; philosophers mean constituent of propositional thought. Machery’s conclusion would drive a wedge between contributions by psychologists and philosophers on concepts. Theories about the former would have no clear role to play in, and cast no light on, the latter, and vice versa. We argue that, on the contrary, (...) ‘concept’ has a single core meaning: a container of stored knowledge pertaining to a single category. This single meaning satisfies both the theories of psychologists and philosophers. The divergence in use of the term ‘concept’ on which Machery focuses arises because words for containers are often used to refer to (a) what is contained by the container and (b) the label of a container. Our account explains what a concept is, and how one might be misled by Machery’s challenge. (shrink)

A very popular argument for the difference between mind and machine are Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. Here we present some of the most famous such arguments, as well as their most famous criticisms. Finally, we offer our own reconstruction of the argument and show why it is not valid.

This is a review discussion of Nenad Miščević’s stimulating new book, Thought Experiments (2022). His mental models account is of great importance in the various current debates about the nature of thought experiments. I discuss some of the pros and cons of his account.

Non-cognitivism is an approach to metaphor that denies the existence of any metaphorical meanings. A metaphor’s only meaning is its literal meaning. The interpretation of metaphor, on this approach, does not consist in metaphorical contents being communicated by being either semantically encoded or pragmatically communicated. Rather, metaphor operates in an entirely non-linguistic way that does not require the postulation of such meanings. Metaphors cause people to see connections, even to grasp new thoughts, but they do not do so by meaning (...) those thoughts or connections. Non-cognitivism faces a stern challenge from the problem of embedding: metaphors embedded in propositional attitude reports seem to require metaphorical meanings in their truth conditions. In this paper, we argue that existing attempts to solve this problem for non-cognitivism have been unsuccessful. We then offer a new solution that differentiates two scope readings of embedded metaphors and explains each in turn. The paper thus suggests that non-cognitivism has enough rescores to account for embedded metaphors. (shrink)

I address two claims that Miščević makes in his book Thought Experiments. The first claim is that literary fictions belong to the broader category of what he terms “Imaginative Enactments in Thought” (IET’s), but are not TE’s properly understood. The second claim is that TE’s are indispensable to analytic philosophy. Both claims appeal to Miščević’s discussion in the opening chapter of what it is for something to be a TE. I argue for the following conclusions: (1) If TE’s are defined (...) in the way that Miščević proposes, then there can in fact be (and indeed are!) works of literary fiction that qualify as TE’s. (2) If TE’s are defi ned in this way and are explained in terms of mental models, then whether there can in fact be analytic philosophy without TE’s depends upon how we understand the relationship between TE’s and counter-factual thinking more broadly construed. (shrink)

In this paper, I deal with recognising an appropriate criterion for distinguishing two competing conceptions of the propositional content among the content realists—the Fregean and the Russellian—especially in connection to some classical proponents of the realist view (Frege, Moore, and Russell). My starting point is a survey characterisation of the two conceptions and the accompanying classification of Russell’s and Moore’s conceptions of the propositional content, which I find problematic on several accounts. I set up a context for my consideration and (...) elaborate on why I find it problematic. My central point is that, given how the classical proponents of propositions understood their respective conceptions, as well as how more recent proponents of propositions (for example, David Kaplan) understood them, one should draw the distinction between the Fregean and the Russellian conception on the grounds of what propositional components do rather than the nature of propositional components (unless, of course, one ultimately reduces the latter to the former). (shrink)

In this article I investigate the nature of the moral duties that citizens of a legitimate state have towards emigrants. A large part of the literature dedicated to the normative study of the migration phenomenon focuses on two major topics: the brain drain phenomenon and the legitimacy of restricting immigrations. If the first of these concerns the moral obligations that individuals have towards a state and their co-nationals, the second regards the policies that a state can justifiably adopt in order (...) to manage migration flows. With the exception of temporary labor migration, less discussed in the literature are the moral duties that we have towards those citizens who chose to emigrate. My answer is that a state has neither more, nor less responsibilities towards its emigrants than it has towards the other citizens. However, the particular way that it can discharge those duties have to pay attention to each citizen’s particular situation, so that public policies dealing specifi cally with the emigrants are required. If we embrace a sufficientarian position, we could see how public policies have to be forged in order to be morally justifiable. I compare in the article two potential ways in which a state could try to discharge its moral duties towards emigrants. The first consists in promoting policies that focus on reverse migration. The second is based on cooperating with host societies and ensuring that emigrants’ rights and well-being are protected to the fullest degree. I argue that the second proposal is the one that can be morally defended, and is in line with moral defenses of reformed temporary labor migration programs which would take into account the rights and legitimate interests of migrants (Baubock and Ruhs: 2022). (shrink)

There is an important difference between a thought that is directed towards a particular object and a thought that is not so directed. For example, there is a difference in my thoughts about my brother, and my thoughts about brothers, more generally. The first has the earmarks of singular thought, while the latter does not. After showing that there is no agreement about the nature of singular thought, I revisit early Russell to find greater clarity. I then advance a version (...) of Millianism that builds on early Russell’s view of singular thought. I argue that the advocates of the direct reference view who argue that being on the receiving end of a name is suffi cient for having singular thoughts about the object named have not provided good reasons for their views. Passing on a name can provide the recipient with a general understanding of the name, but not specific understanding. That is, when acquiring the name, the recipient may not learn the identity of the object named as this very object which, I argue, is required for one having singular thoughts of that object. (shrink)

The role of intuition in understanding in general and in scientific understanding in particular is still very much a subject of a lively philosophical discussion. The role of intuition in thought experimenting is much disputed in its own right, and the arguments range from those that deny any substantial role of intuition in the final inference that the thought experiment is meant to illustrate (eg. Norton or Williamson) to the pivotal role some form of intuition might play (eg. Brown or (...) Miščević). So far, mostly Platonists were defenders of intuition, but in his recent book, Miščević takes on a formidable task to mount a defense of intuition as seen from a naturalist-evolutionist point of view and within his mental modelling approach to thought experiments. I will, while acclaiming certain – and considerable – merits of his approach, nevertheless, insist that certain aspects of intuitive comprehending as it is meant to be going on in the process of thought experimenting remains inexplicable in the naturalist scheme such as Miščević’s. The more mysterious (not to say Platonist) aspects of intuition will, hopefully, be revealed through the analyses of the two very famous thought experiments of Einstein which also figure quite importantly in his scientific opus. I will also have something to say about a few related problems as addressed by Miščević in his book regarding the description of thought experiment and more general imaginative enactments in thought, as well as on whether there is an essential difference between scientific (primarily physical) and metaphysical thought experiments and other thought experiments or related modes of thinking. (shrink)

Generative linguistics is widely claimed to produce theories at the level of computation in the sense outlined by David Marr. Marr even used generative grammar as an example of a computational level theory. At this level, a theory specifi es a function for mapping one kind of information into another. How this function is computed is then specified at the algorithmic level before an account of how this is algorithm is realised by some physical system is presented at the implementation (...) level. This paper will argue that generative linguistics does not fit anywhere within this framework. We will then look at several ways researchers have attempted to modify either the framework of generative theory to reconcile the two approaches. Finally, it presents and discusses an alternative position, anti-realism about generative grammar. While this position has attracted some recent support, it also runs into some of the problems that earlier modifications faced. (shrink)

This reflection on the recent work of Nenad Miščević on thought experiment pursues two themes. One is the congruence between the historical development of the practice of thought experiment in science over the centuries and the development of philosophical accounts of thought experiment. The second is the idea that thought experiment provides a point of contact between common-sense and scientific conceptions of particular phenomena.

The axiom of transitivity has been challenged in economic theorizing for over seventy years. Yet, there does not seem to be any movement in economics towards removing classical rational choice models from introductory microeconomics books. The concept of rationality has similarly been employed in the cognitive sciences and biology, and yet, transitivity has here not only been shown to be violated, but also rationally so. Some economists have thus responded with attempts to develop alternative theories that give up on the (...) axiom of transitivity. In this paper, I argue that there is a conceptual confusion in this debate that rests on the mistaken idea that there is something like the “one true theory of rationality” that can determine axioms like transitivity to be true or false. Instead, I defend a shift towards a pluralism of concepts of rationality as well as models in which transitivity should play a role depending on the purposes of the model at hand. (shrink)

In their discussion of the interpretation of the literary work of fiction, Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen explain that: “Literary appreciation is the appreciation of how a work interprets and develops the general themes which the reader identifies through the application of thematic concepts. […] The thematic concepts are, by themselves, vacuous. They cannot be separated from the way they are ‘anatomized’ in literature and other cultural discourses” (Lamarque and Olsen: 399). The subtle unravelling of the work’s thematic concepts (...) relies on the context of its reception, with its idiosyncratic sensitivities and cultural sensibilities of that time and place. However, cultural sensitivity also has a dark side as it may occasionally ignite a sort of allergic reaction to a work, identifying it as a threat that must be eliminated. My paper examines the case of literary censorship in Israel. Three partially banned works of fiction reflect three aspects of the Israeli right-wing anxiety concerning the Israeli-Palestinian confl ict: The futility of sacrificing Israeli soldiers’ lives, the acknowledgement of the Palestinian perspective, and, fi nally, the possibility of deflecting the animosity between the two nations to a point of allowing for mutual love. (shrink)

What does it mean to encounter a literary work of art? When we talk about them, we refer to literary works as characterizable entities. In a genuine encounter with a literary work, instead, our focus shifts to “what it is about”: we bring to mind the intentional objects it invites us to direct our attention to, typically through reading. If what we encounter is a work of art, however, we are invited to do something beyond that even, namely to attune (...) ourselves to disclose something more profound. Through shifting our focus from the individual to the typical and affectively responding to a work’s characteristics, we disclose a qualitative character that presents itself as of general relevance insofar as it characterizes a specific kind of thing potentially experienced in the world. Our focus shifts from individual intentional objects, such as a character’s view of her partner as standing in need of salvation, to the kinds of values and things manifested therein, such as the peculiar kind of ambiguity inhering a specific kind of commitment. To encounter a literary work of art, I conclude, means to follow the invitation to disclose value essentials, and thus to find a specific kind of truth. (shrink)

As part of a larger effort to explore the multiform relations between philosophy and literature—a research field that attracts growing attention— we focus on the philosophical aspects of literature. Our project tackles the subject of literature’s potential to generate knowledge. In our paper we intend to dwell on self-referential literature. This intriguing dimension of literary expression is associated with works in which self-reflective moves can be traced, that is, texts in which literary writing refers to and reflects on literature itself. (...) The self-reflection of self-referential literature assumes many shapes, affecting in various ways the constitution of both content and form. Thus, our aim becomes twofold. First, we look into variants of literary self-reflection, while pondering the philosophical implications of each of those. Here, we are going to draw on examples from the writings of Stéphane Mallarmé, Paul Valéry, Maurice Blanchot and Clarice Lispector. Second, we propose to consider the necessary conditions and the prospects for obtaining some kind of knowledge by means of self-referential literature. In so doing, we examine alternative conceptions and kinds of knowledge which could be taken into account. (shrink)

The paper proposes a radical change of focus for understanding the fundamental purpose and value of literary interpretation. It criticises an orthodox view in analytical philosophy of literature, according to which theories of meaning in the philosophy of language, in particular Gricean or speech act or other pragmatic theories, offer the most illuminating way to grasp the relevant principles of interpretation. The argument here is that the application of such theories in this context is not just wrong in detail (this (...) or that theory needs revising) but wrong in principle. The focus is wrong. The importation of philosophy of language distorts the essential character of interpretation, which should be seen as involving not so much meaning as value, not individual sentences but whole works, not obsessed with authorial intention but focused on the protocols of reading. (shrink)

The purpose of this paper is twofold: to argue for the value of (1) social science as part of the intellectual activity of writing (rather than righting) and (2) the practice of fiction to that intellectual activity. Writing is a mode of representation that eludes our complete and objective knowledge and always remains partial and temporary. While righting, in contrast, is concerned with the absolute truth and the revelation of the right answer. This paper argues that writing is a more (...) productive, creative, and necessary way of engaging with reality than righting, and that it can offer insights and perspectives for both theory and praxis. Drawing on Stephen King’s view on writing fi ction, this paper will also argue that fiction constitutes a kind of writing and employs a particular form of truth that is conceived as a relation between representation and reality. The paper will conclude by suggesting the need for criminologists— and social scientists more generally—to adopt the perspective of writing to gain a better understanding of the phenomena with which they are concerned. (shrink)

The lyric is a form or genre of poetry often intimately related to subjectivity. But is a lyricism divested of the subject possible? By examining the philosophical refl ections of Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe upon lyricism, poetry, and their relation to subjectivity, this article explicates how an impersonal lyricism is not only possible, but perhaps necessary. If we wish to do justice to the phrasing or saying of poetic language, then we must endeavour to think the displacement of the subject in and (...) by the very language that the poem expresses. Following Lacoue-Labarthe, this article explores the paradoxical turn of lyricism—that it is bound to the subject, but not to its personal expression; rather, to its disappearance, its displacement, in the expression of language itself. By tracing a sketch of Lacoue-Labarthe’s poetics, relating this thought to the lyrical theories of Hamburger and Culler, and providing a brief explication of one of Lacoue-Labarthe’s “poetic” writings, lyricism is shown to be the testament to the disappearance of the subject, the remainder of a disappearance already passed insofar as the poem remains. What remains is that the lyrical subject would be no “subject” at all—only language itself, intimating its own diction. (shrink)

Can one have an aesthetically valuable experience of fiction that takes an immoral perspective? Some have argued that one can. However, some important objections have been raised against this idea. Two objections are: that the immorality involved is confined to fictional reality, and that the aesthetic value of immoral fiction is dictated by a pluralistic attitude that not everyone accepts. My aim is to respond to these challenges and to argue, on the basis of two examples, that even an unlimited (...) immoral perspective can enhance a widespread aesthetic value. (shrink)

In this paper I argue that a norm of literary fiction is to compel the reader to form beliefs about the world as it is. It may seem wrong to suggest that the reason I believe p is because I imagined p, yet literary fiction can make this the case. I argue for an account grounded in indexed doxastic susceptibilities mapped between a fictional context and the particular properties of a reader, more specifically the susceptibilities in her beliefs, attitudes, and (...) psychological states. Works of fiction can be about different things at the same time, some of which are fictive and some of which are factual. Since belief can be weak or strong, partial or complete, tenuous or robust, opaque or clear, there are susceptibilities throughout a doxastic set out of which new beliefs are formed. Skillful works of fiction exploit these susceptibilities and create new ones. This is an aesthetic achievement of such works: they take what should be a norm-violating practice of belief-formation on the basis of imaginative engagement and they make it so. (shrink)