In this article, I show that, when denialists attempt to deny a certainty in Wittgenstein’s sense, they do not even deny anything at all because they are articulating mere nonsense. To clarify this point, I start by providing a brief introduction to Wittgenstein’s conception of “certainty,” paying particular attention not only to the distinction between seeming and genuine doubt, but also to the nonsense generated when violating a certainty. Then, I analyze why we cannot even understand denialists when they try (...) to deny certainties about the existence of the Holocaust and the sphericity of Earth. To this end, I consider the consequences of delegitimizing research procedures, regarding the case of doubt as the normal case, and formulating the denialist doubt through words whose use is incompatible with such doubt. Subsequently, I describe the main tactics used by denialists to try to substitute scientific certainties with alternative ones. Lastly, although denialism concerning certainties cannot even be refuted because it is nonsense, I propose to make deniers as well as the general public aware of such nonsense by asking questions that revolve around incongruences such as those I have previously noted concerning Holocaust denialism and the flat-Earth “theory.”. (shrink)

Heidegger claims that “the Being of beings ‘is’ not itself a being.” While he does not seem to argue for this claim (usually referred to as the “ontological difference”), there is now a very substantial literature that fills this gap. In this article, I subject this literature to philosophical scrutiny. My conclusion is that none of the extant arguments for the ontological difference is sound. Since, by contrast, we have at least two good reasons to think that Being is a (...) being, this suggests that Being is a being, after all. (shrink)

As robots evolve from functional machines to potential sexual companions, they embody both utopian hopes and dystopian fears. This article explores the ethical implications of sex robots, focusing on power dynamics, objectification, and gender performance. Through Ann Cahill’s concept of derivatization, the article argues for a nuanced understanding of sexual objectification in the context of robo-erotics. While sex robots offer new possibilities for intimacy and desire, they also risk reinforcing problematic gender norms and power structures. The article introduces a queer (...) utopian framework, oscillating between hope and disgust, to examine how sex robots might subvert or perpetuate traditional scripts of sexuality. Ultimately, this work aims to situate sex robots within the broader landscape of technological advancement and its potential to reshape human sexuality. (shrink)

In response to this issue’s theme of Can robots be sensual? two propositions are discussed from a design researcher’s perspective. Four devices across two speculative projects Habitat Robots and Soil Protector Robots are presented. Speculative Realist ideas provide reasoning for design approaches to metaphorise sensed environmental data into multi-sensorial performances that the devices embody. Facilitated through the projects are philosophy of design concerns, such as asymmetrical relations, the nature of data, and language about the devices prefiguring sensorial expectations. The performative (...) behaviours of these multi-sensorial robots evoke a sense of things by removing the truthiness of data and thereby emancipating language from privilege and expertise, subverting expectations of technology, and notions of urban Nature. Through Harman’s Quadruple Object, we speculate on asymmetricality within object relations, including between the devices and the practices of design itself. Thereby, allowing ontological design implications to be reviewed – where acts of designing in turn design us; design processes are not only entwined prefiguratively, but are companion output artefacts of these technological ecology interfaces. The devices bring together and physicalise questions of contextual boundaries and politics between humans, technology, and Nature. (shrink)

In this article, I show how two modes of predication and quantification in a modal context allow one to (a) define what it is for an individual or relation to exist, (b) define identity conditions for properties and relations conceived hyperintensionally, (c) define identity conditions for individuals and prove the necessity of identity for both individuals and relations, (d) derive the central definition of free logic as a theorem, (e) define the essential properties of abstract objects and provide a framework (...) for defining the essential properties of ordinary objects, and (f) derive a theory of truth. I also describe my indebtedness to the work of Terence Parsons and take the opportunity to advance the discussion in connection with an objection raised to the theory of essential properties. (shrink)