Plato’s Republic is governed by an analogy drawn between the structures of cities and souls. Because the inner workings of souls are difficult to discern, we might better find the soul’s nature and virtues by looking at the city’s nature and virtues. Despite successfully using the analogy to discern the nature of the soul, its virtues, and its proper ordering, the Republic frequently obscures the very analogy that functions as its guiding thread, and it is not at all obvious whether (...) the political material in Books V–VII has a psychological correlate. This essay develops a psychological reading of key moments in the dialogue where the city-soul analogy fades in favor of more apparently political content. Focusing on the Allegory of the Cave, it argues that when the Cave is read as a “psychic drama,” it discloses reason’s drama within the soul. Like the freed prisoner, reason must be liberated from imprisonment alongside the sub-rational elements of the soul so that it may see the truth by which it can be nourished. However, reason must also descend, like the prisoner, to the sub-rational elements of the soul in order to care for them, for its own sake and for theirs. Read this way, the Republic presents an account of reason which rules the passions in the “precise sense” of Book I, that is, for their sake, and not simply for its own liberation and well-being. (shrink)

In this paper, I argue against the institutional reading of the persuasion of the laws in Plato’s Crito. My interpretation focuses on how the clause “persuade or obey” may be read such as to allow citizens to disobey the law or its commands without such actions being unjust. I first summarize the authoritarian position of the laws and present the existing interpretations of the persuasion of the laws. I then show why I believe that none of the existing interpretations is (...) satisfactory. Finally, I present my own interpretation of the persuasion of the laws, which follows Socrates’ own rule of following reason and the strongest available argument. (shrink)

In GC I.1 Aristotle criticizes the monists and pluralists for accepting positions that eliminate either generation or alteration, and in GC I.4 he defends the existence of both. Thus, he must believe that his account is immune to those objections he raises against his predecessors, but it is difficult to reconstruct these objections, and so difficult to discern how Aristotle distinguishes his own account from theirs. In this paper, I propose a new reconstruction of these objections, and I show how (...) Aristotle’s own account is immune to them so reconstructed. On my interpretation, Aristotle argues that neither the monists nor the pluralists can explain the generation of a substance. The monists cannot explain how an ultimate subject of predication–one mark of substance–is generated. The pluralists cannot explain how a being that can alter–another mark of substance–is generated. I subsequently show how Aristotle’s own account in GC I.4 sufficiently diverges from his predecessors to allow something that is both generable and alterable. (shrink)

Vain emotions are, according to Epicurus, the source of our mental disturbance. The aim of this paper is to discuss and analyze this connection by clarifying the structure of vain emotions in Epicurean philosophy. In order to achieve this, I present, first, the major lines of interpretation regarding the structure of epicurean emotions. Second, I highlight potential problems for each one of these interpretations. Third, I conclude that the existing interpretations cannot capture the whole picture regarding the epicurean structure of (...) emotions and thus I propose an alternative reading of the latter which surpasses the problems facing the existing interpretations. (shrink)

In the Parmenides Plato claims that by relinquishing Forms one would entirely destroy tên tou dialegesthai dunamin. I argue that this peculiar phrase does not indicate, as often suggested, the power or possibility of all discourse or thought, but the power of dialectic, i. e. the highest science; and that its preservation is, for Plato, a decisive reason for the necessity of the Forms.

My aim in this paper is to show that Plato’s Phaedo makes an important contribution to the development of ideas about the commensuration in value of heterogeneous items that is needed for practical reasoning and rational choice. Because the passage I focus on, the so-called ‘right exchange’ passage at 69a-c, has not usually been read this way, I motivate the reading by showing how it resolves some puzzles local to the Phaedo concerning the stark contrast Socrates develops between the virtues (...) of philosophers and nonphilosophers, ordinary people who do not pursue wisdom single-mindedly, applying to the latter labels like ‘strange’, ‘unreasonable’, ‘illusory’ and ‘slavish’. Socrates says that one should, and suggests that philosophers do, use wisdom as their currency whereas nonphilosophers use pleasure (and perhaps also pains, fears, etc., or bodily conditions in general) as their currency (or currencies). Although it has been generally understood that the basis for this contrast lies in how the two groups evaluate, the details have remained murky. I argue that it’s due to the properties of pleasure (or bodily conditions in general) qua measure of value, in particular pleasure’s context-dependence, that nonphilosophers’ judgements about virtue, e.g. the courage and moderation of particular acts or people, are defective in the ways Socrates says they are. (shrink)

With regard to Aristotle’s discussion of chance and fortune in Phys. II.5–6, interpreters maintain that, after having provided a specific definition of fortune, applicable to intentional chance processes, in ch. 5, Aristotle is, in ch. 6, seeking to identify a specific meaning of αὐτόματον, which exclusively applies to strictly natural chance processes. When understood in such terms, however, ch. 6 turns out to be problematic, insofar as the examples Aristotle uses to illustrate αὐτόματον refer to mixed natural and intentional chance (...) processes. To show that ch. 6 is internally consistent, I will argue that Aristotle’s goal simply is to emphasise the generic quality of the notion of αὐτόματον compared to that of τύχη and that the examples are chiefly geared towards this aim. I will also explain why such a treatment of chance is relevant within his critical analysis of Empedocles’ and Democritus’ theories of τύχη and αὐτόματον. (shrink)

This paper deals with the physics of Anaximander and argues that, in his theory, the drying up of the sea cannot be accounted for in terms of the kind of conflict envisaged in his main fragment between the four basic substances: the hot, the cold, the wet and the dry (DK 12B1). In so doing, the paper takes issue with a classic interpretation of Anaximander’s cosmology advocated by Jaap Mansfeld (2011). This issue also brings us to a wider philosophical problem: (...) are meteorological phenomena in general amenable to this conflict according to Anaximander? In the conclusion, a few conjectural remarks are made regarding what may have been the real explanandum of this theory. (shrink)

Aristotle is believed to have introduced the focal meaning of friendship in Eudemian Ethics VII.2 and then to have formulated it more generally in Metaphysics Γ.2. Bonitz’s unjustifiable emendation of the text underscores these interpretations. This paper therefore reads the MSS and supposes that the EE passage introduces a wider focal meaning based on the theory presented in the Categories, one that does not imply referential relationships between the primary and secondary terms. This wider focal meaning can help explain disputed (...) terms in practical philosophy, such as “friendship” and “like-mindedness,” without invoking the Form of the Good. (shrink)