This paper discusses the debate regarding the terms makarios (“blessed”) and eudaimon (“happy”) in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics. In it, I identify two scholarly conclusions regarding these terms: (1) the distinction thesis: that the words mean different things in the text, and (2) the interchangeability thesis: that the words do not mean different things in the text, and may be substituted for one another. I argue that the theories should both be used as heuristic tools of analysis, rather than only one (...) of them being used as a universal rule to be applied to the text. Additionally, I argue that a third heuristic device is needed: I forward that while makarios and eudaimon are sometimes interchangeable (contra the distinction thesis) they are not synonymous (contra the interchangeability thesis). Rather, in some cases, both terms can be translated as “happy,” but they are being used by Aristotle in reference to subjects with distinct natures. In these instances, eudaimonia can sometimes be interpreted as a properly human term, which we cannot apply to the gods. Or, if it is applied to the gods, it must be applied in a distinct, qualified way. Meanwhile, makarios can sometimes be interpreted as a properly divine term, used in reference to the gods or to a god-like status achieved by a human being who has superseded normal human achievement or capacity. (shrink)

The first translations of Philo into the Italian vernacular date back to the second half of the 16th century and took place in Venice. The cosmopolitan and flourishing Venetian environment plays a fundamental role in the Mediterranean and European economy and is at the center of a network of international relationships. The city is a center of attraction for intellectuals and artists and the book business is experiencing great development there. The Venetian translations of Philo constitute an interesting mirror of (...) different positions, more or less linked to reformed theses or to the Church of Rome. They are conducted over a period of twenty-six years (1548–1574), a period in which we witness profound changes in the relations between Rome and Venice. Philo seems to be able to constitute a mirror and perhaps an instrument of such changes. In the lively climate of the ‘Serenissima’, crossed by reformist and counter-reformist impulses, where cultural openness is expressed in publications, literary meetings, cenacles, academies, confraternities and where the vernacular version of ancient works has a certain diffusion, Philo is used with in different ways by representatives of different trends. The very fact that his work is translated takes on a meaning that is not only erudite and, probably, the date of the individual translations is significant: Ballino is closer to Erasmian positions, Ferentilli is more linked to the Church of Rome, Zini is more nuanced and probably changes his positions with the passing of years and events. (shrink)

In this paper I show that Aristotle’s widely criticised exclusion of Platonic efficient causes at Metaph. A 6.988a7–17 is defensible as an interpretation of Plato, and that alternative accounts are unpersuasive. I argue that Aristotle is only interested in – what he supposes to be – Plato’s first principles and that the usual candidates that are brought forward in scholarship as possible first principles and efficient causes (e.g. from the Timaeus and the Philebus) all fall short in crucial respects according (...) to Aristotle. This reading has the dual benefit of illuminating Aristotle’s strategy in book A and of letting him appear as a more trustworthy doxographer of his predecessors’ views. (shrink)

Can everyone be wise? Is wisdom open to all or an exception reserved for a few, or perhaps for none? In this context, what is the role of the ‘example’ and the ‘imitation’? Aim of my paper is to reflect on these questions in reference to Ancient Cynicism. Specifically, my goal is to analyze whether the Cynic wisdom and, consequently, life (bios) – characterized by a complete opposition to that of the common man – was intended for everyone or only (...) for exceptional individuals, for specific types of people. In examining this aspect, I will focus particularly on the example represented by the life of the first Cynic, Diogenes of Sinope. I will show how it has been differently interpreted and understood throughout the long history of Cynicism. My attention will be primarily on Onesicritus of Astypalaea, who, contrary to certain modern simplifications and negations, represents a very interesting case in the history of Cynicism. He was a Cynic who did not live cynically. Therefore, more generally, I will demonstrate how differently Cynic philosophy could not only be followed but also reinterpreted: another sign of the theoretical fertility of this philosophical movement. (shrink)

The aim of this paper, which is devoted to the Proclean Commentary on the Alcibiades I, is to explain not only why this dialogue is so popular in Neoplatonism, i.e. why it is considered the foundation of Plato’s teaching, but also its methodological importance for reading the proems of the dialogues. For, in my opinion, it has not yet been properly investigated whether and why the two issues, i.e. the introductory importance and the importance for grasping the relevance of the (...) proems, are closely linked. I will therefore first try to show how the isagogical questions are perfectly embedded in a philosophical system that has redefined the very criteria of textual analysis around the idea that each dialogue is a literary microcosm analogous to the macrocosmic universe. I will then show how the exegetical methods proposed by Proclus in his Commentary on the Alcibiades are influenced by certain theoretical assumptions that are useful for reading the dialogues in general, and finally I will demonstrate how the proem of the Alcibiades allows us to re-evaluate the importance of the proems that Plato appended to his writings. (shrink)

A passage from Michael of Ephesus’ Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, book V (p. 50, 6–10 Hayduck), gives some information on the Anonymous Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, books II–IV. Michael cites a series of ancient annotations to the third book, written by ancient exegetes and which have come down to him. It can therefore be assumed that Michael had the Anonymous Commentary in front of him when he wrote these lines. It is thus possible to assume that it was (...) Michael of Ephesus himself who organised the entire commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics and inserted the Anonymous Commentary on Books II-IV after Eustratius’ commentary on Book I and before his own commentary on Book V. (shrink)

Aristotle’s classification of ideal number in Metaphysics M 6 has often been considered an unfair presentation of Plato’s actual views. I take another look at the passage and argue that Aristotle is a more careful critic than has been usually recognised. In particular, I argue that much of the scholarly discussion on the passage has failed to take account of Aristotle’s deeper concern, namely, the conditions necessary for numbers to be ordinal. I then set Aristotle’s critique within the broader context (...) of his concern to separate Form from Number, and thus to separate metaphysical questions from mathematical ones. The latter half of the article shows some of the consequences of mixing mathematics with metaphysics from a systematic and historical point of view. (shrink)

The doctrine of unity of opposites lays in the centre of the debate on Heraclitus’ philosophy. The present article proposes a critical analysis of the mainstream interpretation of geometrical oppositions (fragments DK 22 B 59, B 60 and B 103) as mere examples of different points of view. Instead, we suggest that these fragments are fundamental pieces in Heraclitus cosmology and that they are traces of a circular and archaic paradigm. Indeed, cyclical formulations are spread throughout the fragments and, read (...) in connection with geometrical oppositions, perform a useful model to describe how permanence and change can be complementary events. In this context, circularity can be a key to the comprehension of unity of opposites as a result of interchangeable processes – as day and night, life and death, beginning and end – so that opposites are part of a concrete and vital unity. (shrink)

This article asks the question “Why did Plato not write the ‘unwritten doctrine’?” and answers it by citing a combination of two obstacles. The first derives from the limitations of the episteme available to an embodied soul about the essence of the good. Even if the dialectician has access to some kind of knowledge, the mismatch between the unchanging essence of the good and the precarious logoi which aim to identify it (and allow others some measure of access to it) (...) can never fully be overcome. At best, Socrates (or Plato) can lead souls to an incomplete account of it: It is possible that even the most expert dialectician can only have a claim to knowledge, but no absolute certainty. Another obstacle lies in the audience or readership itself: No shortcut to understanding is possible, and yet a mere written presentation, which is all they have, is just such a shortcut, and so represents an empty promise. In memory of Charles H. Kahn (1928–2023), a letter of his from September 5, 1989, concerning the question “Why did Plato not write the ‘unwritten doctrine’?” is published, along with some comments. (shrink)

In this paper I examine Socrates’ argument that presupposes an audience familiar with Forms and explains why the sight-lovers are not philosophers. It is divided into three parts: the first part (476a1–6) shows why each Form is one in number; the second part (476a6–9) distinguishes Forms from their sensible appearances; and the third part (476a10–d6) draws an analogy between philosophers – people being awake and sight-lovers – people being asleep. Remarkably, the argument works only for opposites, which are mistakenly identified (...) by the sight-lovers with sensible things. Also in this paper I suggest an alternative interpretation of the so-called ‘Two Worlds Theory’ which is based on the distinction between the objects of knowledge and opinion. (shrink)

It is commonly supposed that one can build Aristotle’s account of luck (τύχη) and good fortune (εὐτυχία) from Ph. II 4–6 and Eth. Eud. VIII 2. Indeed, in these texts, he is concerned with providing a general account of each. There has, however, been some dispute on the relationship between the texts. Some argue that the two accounts conflict, and the notion of τύχη or εὐτυχία we find in the Ph. is not the one that Aristotle has in mind in (...) Eth. Eud. Others argue that there are two notions of “luck” in Eth. Eud.: one that fits with the account in the Ph. and another that is more stable. Almost no one argues that εὐτυχία in Eth. Eud. VIII 2 is a subspecies of τύχη. I will argue that Aristotle does indeed have two notions of εὐτυχία, a narrow and a broad one. But I show that the distinction is set aside in Eth. Eud. VIII 2 where Aristotle only discusses εὐτυχία as a subspecies of τύχη. We see this especially if we compare the account in Eth. Eud. with what Aristotle says about εὐτυχία in his other ethical treatises. The upshot is that there is a narrower focus in Eth. Eud. than in the other treatises when it comes to εὐτυχία. (shrink)

This essay investigates the little-known dialogue by Zacharias Scholasticus entitled Ammonius, a philosophical dispute over the creation of the world. It examines in particular Zacharias’ skill in portraying the character of Ammonius, a pagan teacher of philosophy in Alexandria. Even before illustrating his own eternalist theses, which are later refuted by Zacharias, Ammonius is introduced through subtle yet unequivocal allusions as a malus Socrates, i.e. a bad teacher who corrupts young people and alienates them from philosophy, while being well received (...) by the city in which he teaches. This reversal forms the broader plot that runs through the narrative framework of the dialogue, which is based on the borrowing – and inversion – of narrative schemes, mainly from Plato’s Phaedrus. The Ammonius will ultimately be presented as a paradigm of the appropriation of Plato not only on a superficial level (linguistic borrowings, the dialogue form itself), but also on a deeper and more structural level, i.e. as a remarkable case of borrowing Plato’s dramaturgy and irony. (shrink)

Pherecydes’ pseudepigraphic letter to Thales (Diog. Laert. I 122) is of uncertain date. It revolves around the idea that the book of Pherecydes should be interpreted allegorically. The aim of this paper is twofold: on the one hand, to contextualise the composition of the epistle through the examination of ancient witnesses who focus on Pherecydes’ obscurity; on the other hand, it shows to what extent Numenius, Celsus and Porphyry’s allegoric interpretation has misled some authoritative modern reconstruction of Pherecydes’ doctrines, as (...) it is today generally agreed that he taught the immortality of the human soul and cycle of reincarnation. (shrink)

Whereas several zoological Aristotelian works have been preserved, Aristotle is reported to have written only one short botanical treatise. Such reports seem to conflict with his self-described ambition to study plants as well as animals. Even though this treatise is now lost, the available evidence suggests that Aristotle had valid reasons to find the subject-matter of plants much less interesting, as their activities amount to a subset of what animals do. When studying attributes common to both plants and animals in (...) the transmitted corpus, Aristotle systematically focuses on the case of the most complex animals and, once an explanatory model has been found, proceeds to apply it to the remaining cases with less details. I argue that this procedure, although it runs counters to the intuition that one ought to start with the most simple case, corresponds to a general scientific method. Consequently, most of Aristotle’s botany is found to be already encapsulated in the main results of his study of animals. (shrink)