Two portraits of the Humean moral agent

Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (4):301–334 (2002)
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Abstract

Among contemporary ethicists, Hume is perhaps best known for his views about morality’s practical import and his spectator-centered account of moral evaluation. Yet according to the so-called “spectator complaint”, these two aspects of Hume’s moral theory cannot be reconciled with one another. I argue that the answer to the spectator complaint lies in Hume’s account of “goodness” and “greatness of mind”. Through a discussion of these two virtues, Hume makes clear the connection between his views about moral motivation and his understanding of moral evaluation by providing us with two portraits of the Humean moral agent

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Kate Abramson
Indiana University, Bloomington

Citations of this work

A Humean particularist virtue ethic.Erin Frykholm - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2171-2191.
The Alliance of Virtue and Vanity in Hume's Moral Theory.Philip A. Reed - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (4):595-614.
Happy to Unite, or Not?Kate Abramson - 2006 - Philosophy Compass 1 (3):290-302.
Hume and Humeans on Practical Reason.Michelle Mason - 2005 - Hume Studies 31 (2):347-378.

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