Commentary on d’Hoine

Proceedings of the Boston Area Colloquium of Ancient Philosophy 29 (1):38-52 (2014)
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Abstract

Professor d’Hoine claims that Proclus assigns a specific ontological function to the Form of Likeness in his Commentary on the Parmenides. According to d’Hoine, for Proclus, each individual must, qua individual striving to imitate the form, present a difference; this difference or unlikeness of one member of a coordinate kind to another, the plurality of participants in a Form, is Form’s by the Form of Unlikeness. And in a similar way, the Form of Likeness then guarantees the imitation of the Form by the particular. I try to show that in other passages in Proclus’ oeuvre, likeness extends to include many more relationships than the Forms instantiation as a material particular. Hence, Likeness is not confined to this specific ontological function.

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