Who is Afraid of Epistemology’s Regress Problem?

Philosophical Studies 126 (2):191-217 (2005)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

What follows is a taxonomy of arguments that regresses of inferential justification are vicious. They fall out into four general classes: conceptual arguments from incompleteness, conceptual arguments from arbitrariness, ought-implies-can arguments from human quantitative incapacities, and ought-implies can arguments from human qualitative incapacities. They fail with a developed theory of "infinitism" consistent with valuational pluralism and modest epistemic foundationalism.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 103,401

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Six Arguments Against ‘Ought Implies Can’.Jonah Goldwater - 2020 - Southwest Philosophy Review 36 (1):45-54.
Zipper arguments and duties regarding future generations.Tim Meijers - 2024 - Politics, Philosophy and Economics 23 (2):181-204.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
217 (#121,216)

6 months
10 (#281,857)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Scott Aikin
Vanderbilt University

Citations of this work

Viciousness and the structure of reality.Ricki Leigh Bliss - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 166 (2):399-418.
What Work the Fundamental?Ricki Leigh Bliss - 2019 - Erkenntnis 84 (2):359-379.
Metaphysical Foundationalism: Consensus and Controversy.Thomas Oberle - 2022 - American Philosophical Quarterly 59 (1):97-110.
Epistemic and dialectical regress.Michael Rescorla - 2009 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (1):43 – 60.

View all 23 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The structure of empirical knowledge.Laurence BonJour - 1985 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Empiricism and the philosophy of mind.Wilfrid Sellars - 1956 - Minnesota Studies in the Philosophy of Science 1:253-329.
An Analysis of Knowledge and Valuation.Clarence Irving Lewis - 1946 - La Salle, IL, USA: Open Court.

View all 52 references / Add more references