An Interpretation of Brouwer’s Argument for Bar Induction via Infinitary Proof Theory

Proceedings of the XXIII World Congress of Philosophy 56:5-9 (2018)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Brouwer introduced a principle called the bar induction to develop his intuitionism including the theory of choice sequences. In order to justify the bar induction, Brouwer supposed a fundamental assumption on the range of canonical proofs. The assumption, however, has been controversial and discussed in papers. Especially, we have to explain the reason why Brouwer introduced the fundamental assumption. In this paper, we point out that Brouwer’s argument is very close to the method of the Ω-rule due to Buchholz, which has been a main tool in infinitary proof theory since 1970’s. Based on this observation, we explain why Brouwer needed the fundamental assumption.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 101,553

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Brouwer’s Real Thesis on Bars.Wim Veldman - 2006 - Philosophia Scientiae:21-42.
Brouwer’s Real Thesis on Bars.Wim Veldman - 2006 - Philosophia Scientiae:21-42.
Brouwer's Incomplete Objects.Joop Niekus - 2010 - History and Philosophy of Logic 31 (1):31-46.
Arguments for the continuity principle.Mark van Atten & Dirk van Dalen - 2002 - Bulletin of Symbolic Logic 8 (3):329-347.
Brouwer, as never read by Husserl.Mark van Atten - 2003 - Synthese 137 (1-2):3-19.
Book Review: Mark van Atten. On Brouwer. [REVIEW]O. Bradley Bassler - 2006 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 47 (4):581-599.
Brouwer's Conception of Truth.Casper Storm Hansen - 2016 - Philosophia Mathematica 24 (3):379-400.

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-05-08

Downloads
11 (#1,434,156)

6 months
6 (#917,074)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references