Problem neutralności metaetyki

Etyka 11:127-138 (1973)
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Abstract

Moral Philosophy, says the author, neither is nor should be neutral with respect to ethical systems. He argues for rationalism as a definite all-embracing methodological directive that may secure a critical, non-dogmatic approach to all views, including moral views.

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