On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social Identity Relevant?

Philosophic Exchange 29 (1) (1999)
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Abstract

On what basis should we make an epistemic assessment of another’s authority to impart knowledge? Is social identity a legitimate feature to take into account when assessing epistemic reliability? This paper argues that, in some cases, social identity is a relevant feature to take into account in assessing a person’s credibility.

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reprint Alcoff, Linda Martin (2000) "On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social Identity Relevant?". In Zack, Naomi, On Judging Epistemic Credibility: Is Social Identity Relevant?, pp. 235-262: Wiley-Blackwell (2000)

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Linda Martín Alcoff
CUNY Graduate Center

Citations of this work

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The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Race.Naomi Zack (ed.) - 2017 - New York, USA: Oxford University Press USA.
Objectivity in feminist epistemology.Briana Toole - 2022 - Philosophy Compass 17 (11):e12885.

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