Fitch's Argument and Typing Knowledge

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 49 (2):153-176 (2008)
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Abstract

Fitch's argument purports to show that if all truths are knowable then all truths are known. The argument exploits the fact that the knowledge predicate or operator is untyped and may thus apply to sentences containing itself. This article outlines a response to Fitch's argument based on the idea that knowledge is typed. The first part of the article outlines the philosophical motivation for the view, comparing it to the motivation behind typing truth. The second, formal part presents a logic in which knowledge is typed and demonstrates that it allows nonlogical truths to be knowable yet unknown.

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A. C. Paseau
University of Oxford

Citations of this work

Knowledge of Mathematics without Proof.Alexander Paseau - 2015 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 66 (4):775-799.
A Defense of Temperate Epistemic Transparency.Eleonora Cresto - 2012 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 41 (6):923-955.

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References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
A logical analysis of some value concepts.Frederic Fitch - 1963 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 28 (2):135-142.
Reflecting on incompleteness.Solomon Feferman - 1991 - Journal of Symbolic Logic 56 (1):1-49.
Semantical paradox.Tyler Burge - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (4):169-198.

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