Inter-species variation in colour perception

Philosophical Studies 142 (2):197 - 220 (2009)
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Abstract

Inter-species variation in colour perception poses a serious problem for the view that colours are mind-independent properties. Given that colour perception varies so drastically across species, which species perceives colours as they really are? In this paper, I argue that all do. Specifically, I argue that members of different species perceive properties that are determinates of different, mutually compatible, determinables. This is an instance of a general selectionist strategy for dealing with cases of perceptual variation. According to selectionist views, objects simultaneously instantiate a plurality of colours, all of them genuinely mind-independent, and subjects select from amongst this plurality which colours they perceive. I contrast selectionist views with relationalist views that deny the mind-independence of colour, and consider some general objections to this strategy

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Keith Allen
University of York

Citations of this work

Color pluralism.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2007 - Philosophical Review 116 (4):563-601.
Color Illusion.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):751-775.
The Multiply Qualitative.Mark Eli Kalderon - 2011 - Mind 120 (478):239-262.
Color.Barry Maund - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.

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References found in this work

Sameness and Substance Renewed.David Wiggins - 2001 - New York: Cambridge University Press. Edited by David Wiggins.
Color realism and color science.Alex Byrne & David R. Hilbert - 2003 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 26 (1):3-21.
A Sensible Subjectivism.David Wiggins - 1987 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.

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