Should We Assess the Basic Premises of an Argument for Truth or Acceptability?

Abstract

In this paper I challenge the currently fashionable view that we should assess the basic premises of an argument for acceptability rather than for truth, and argue in favour of recognizing premise-truth as a criterion of argument goodness in one important sense and premise-acceptability as a criterion of argument goodness in another important sense.

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Derek Allen
University of Toronto, St. George Campus

Citations of this work

Can Cogency Vanish?Gilbert Plumer - 2016 - Cogency: Journal of Reasoning and Argumentation 8 (1):89-109.

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Problems in Argument Analysis and Evaluation.Trudy Govier - 2018 - Windsor: University of Windsor.

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