IX—Unmistaken: Imaginative Perception and Illusion

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 124 (3):205-228 (2024)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Sometimes what we perceive appears other than it is. The term ‘illusion’ is often used to capture the broad variety of cases in which this occurs. But some of these cases are better described as cases of imaginative perception—cases in which what we perceive appears as we imagine it to be. I argue that imaginative perception is to be sharply contrasted with illusions variously conceived as cases of misleading appearance and cases of perceptual error. By removing the blanket term ‘illusion’ from our description of such cases, we can better see the underlying complex of cognitive processes they involve.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,793

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2024-09-14

Downloads
19 (#1,069,031)

6 months
19 (#145,646)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Adrian J. T. Alsmith
King's College London

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The Virtual and the Real.David J. Chalmers - 2017 - Disputatio 9 (46):309-352.
Intentionalism defended.Alex Byrne - 2001 - Philosophical Review 110 (2):199-240.
The silence of the senses.Charles Travis - 2004 - Mind 113 (449):57-94.
Perceptual Content Defended.Susanna Schellenberg - 2011 - Noûs 45 (4):714 - 750.

View all 33 references / Add more references