Transition from Doubt to Knowledge and Comprehension of the Mind itself in Descartes’ Philosophy

Beytulhikme An International Journal of Philosophy 1 (1):94-109 (2011)
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Abstract

Descartes uses skepticism as a method in the search for truth and afterwards he arrives at the knowledge of truth by conception cogito, which is an intuitive proposition. Comprehension of the mind itself is asserted from which ego cannot be cut from thinking, and this conception is based on the existence of God who does exist to be contained in the mind conceptually. God is stated the most perfect being which does rescue mind from doubt and show its real being it.

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