Abstract

This thesis seeks to determine the role of moral sentiments in a compelling account of human rights. The thesis argues that moral sentiments are central to human rights valuation but have been neglected or attacked by many past and contemporary human rights theorists. Determining sentimentality's appropriate role could lead to the effective employment of emotionally grounded approaches that could better promote human rights adherence. However, building an account of human rights that rests solely on sentiments is also unsatisfactory because the sentiments can be manipulated in ways that tend to violate human rights, as the recent experience of populist political leaders demonstrates. Therefore, the thesis will argue that a compelling account of human rights based on sentiments must also be directed rationally. To this end, the thesis will draw on Hume's moral sentimentalism to develop an inclusive theory of human rights that gives a significant role to reason. In developing this account, the thesis will engage with the debate over the place of reason in Hume's moral sentimentalism. While some hold a pure sentimentalist interpretation of Hume, others maintain that reason has a supporting – if subordinate – role in his theory. This theory defends the latter interpretation of Hume and argues that it can be used as a framework for developing a compelling theory of human rights.