Abstract

The paper investigates Marya Schechtman’s narrativist account of self and personal identity, which she dubbed the “Narrative Self-Constitution View”. I lay out the main features of this conception by contrasting it with the views of Derek Parfit, a major contemporary representative of the psychological relationalist tradition originating from Locke and Hume, to which Schechtman’s theory, and narrativism in general, may be seen as a major alternative. After presenting the main features of these two accounts, I set out to defend Parfit against an important criticism of Schechtman which seeks to discredit Parfit’s notion of quasi-memory (and quasi-belief, quasi-desire etc. as well). Parfit’s psychological continuity view essentially depends on these notions, hence undermining them provides a ground for accepting narrativism. However, I also argue that the psychological continuity view fails seriously as well, as it does not account for identification I take to be a necessary condition of being the same person. Lastly, I discuss certain possible explanations of identification, and address the question whether these support the narrativist or the psychological continuity view.