The Lures of Akrasia

Philosophy 92 (2):167-181 (2017)
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Abstract

There is more akrasia than meets the eye: it can occur in speech and perception, cognitively and emotionally as well as between decision and action. The lures of akrasia are the same as those that are exercised in ordinary psychological and cognitive inferential contexts. But because it is over-determined and because it occurs in opaque intentional contexts, its attribution remains highly fallible.

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Author's Profile

Amelie Rorty
PhD: Yale University; Last affiliation: Boston University

Citations of this work

Habitual Weakness.Kenneth Silver - 2019 - Thought: A Journal of Philosophy 8 (4):270-277.
Passionate Akrasia.Michael T. Michael - 2019 - Philosophia 47 (3):569-585.

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References found in this work

Desiring the bad: An essay in moral psychology.Michael Stocker - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (12):738-753.
II*—Deliberation and Practical Reason.David Wiggins - 1976 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 76 (1):29-52.

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