Hypothetical Interventions and Belief Changes

Foundations of Science 24 (4):681-704 (2019)
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Abstract

According to Woodward’s influential account of explanation, explanations have a counterfactual structure, and explanatory counterfactuals are analysed in terms of causal relations and interventions. In this paper, we provide a formal semantics of explanatory counterfactuals based on a Ramsey Test semantics of conditionals. Like Woodward’s account, our account is guided by causal considerations. Unlike Woodward’s account, it makes no reference to causal graphs and it also covers cases of explanation where interventions are impossible.

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Author Profiles

Lorenzo Casini
IMT School for Advanced Studies, Lucca
Holger Andreas
University Of British Columbia, Okanagan

References found in this work

Philosophical papers.David Kellogg Lewis - 1983 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Depth: An Account of Scientific Explanation.Michael Strevens - 2008 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
A Theory of Conditionals.Robert Stalnaker - 1968 - In Nicholas Rescher (ed.), Studies in Logical Theory. Oxford,: Blackwell. pp. 98-112.
Causation.David Lewis - 1973 - Journal of Philosophy 70 (17):556-567.

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