Inferring beliefs as subjectively imprecise probabilities

Theory and Decision 73 (1):161-184 (2012)
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Abstract

We propose a method for estimating subjective beliefs, viewed as a subjective probability distribution. The key insight is to characterize beliefs as a parameter to be estimated from observed choices in a well-defined experimental task and to estimate that parameter as a random coefficient. The experimental task consists of a series of standard lottery choices in which the subject is assumed to use conventional risk attitudes to select one lottery or the other and then a series of betting choices in which the subject is presented with a range of bookies offering odds on the outcome of some event that the subject has a belief over. Knowledge of the risk attitudes of subjects conditions the inferences about subjective beliefs. Maximum simulated likelihood methods are used to estimate a structural model in which subjects employ subjective beliefs to make bets. We present evidence that some subjective probabilities are indeed best characterized as probability distributions with non-zero variance

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References found in this work

La Prévision: Ses Lois Logiques, Ses Sources Subjectives.Bruno de Finetti - 1937 - Annales de l'Institut Henri Poincaré 7 (1):1-68.
Maxmin expected utility with non-unique prior.Itzhak Gilboa & David Schmeidler - 1989 - Journal of Mathematical Economics 18 (2):141–53.
Elicitation of Personal Probabilities and Expectations.Leonard Savage - 1971 - Journal of the American Statistical Association 66 (336):783-801.
Risk, ambiguity, and the Savage axioms.Daniel Ellsberg - 1961 - Quarterly Journal of Economics:643–69.
Risk aversion and incentive effects.Charles Holt & Susan Laury - 2002 - American Economic Review 92 (5):1644–55.

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