Abstract

The dissertation considers two different theories of measurement in Kant's Critical philosophy. The first is found in the Critique of Pure Reason. The second is found in the Critique of Judgment. In the former, Kant shows how the size of an object is structured by the necessary rules of the understanding and imagination in terms of its spatial dimensions. In the latter, Kant shows how the actual measurement of this spatial object is estimated. ;Through a detailed inquiry we argue that, the aesthetic estimation of measurement serves as a precondition for the possibility of spatializing an object. It is only by viewing both components as functioning together, that Kant's account is complete. ;The first Chapter takes a historical approach to this issue. Kant's Precritical work is considered. The second Chapter examines Kant's theory specifically as found in the Analytic of the First Critique. Finally, the third chapter examines Kant's views on magnitude and measurement in depth in the third Critique. Here we see why this account is needed to condition his prior views