The Unworthiness of Nietzschean Values

Animus 14:67-78 (2010)
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Abstract

We thoughtlessly use the Nietzschean language of values to encompass our moral principles, our intuitions of the holy and the beautiful, our need for truth. Yet Nietzsche showed that “values” are the creations or products of human will, not discoveries of intelligence, illuminations of love, or exigencies of need. We hear talk of “absolute values” or “objective values” as if there can be values without evaluation: Nietzsche was clear that nothing is intrinsically good or valuable in itself; values are human choices, estimations, decisions, the expressions of human will. An alternative language is more appropriate to communicate what we hold to be intrinsically valuable, namely Würde . Human beings have value if we can use them for our own purposes but they have an invaluable dignity beyond whatever purposes we may have in mind for them. Activities may have an intrinsic worthiness whatever the market demand or current estimation establishes their value to be

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