Disagreeing despite the data: the destruction of the factual commons

Lanham: Lexington Books (2024)
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Abstract

Drawing on twentieth-century philosophy of science and language, this book identifies three requirements for widespread factual agreement: a pervasive habit of checking assumptions, densely connected communities, and projects that straddle those communities. When communities are insulated from each other, belief segregation follows.

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