Abstract

"Naturalized semantics" is the attempt to define semantic notions like meaning and representation in terms of purely non-semantic properties. It is widely accepted that mental states like beliefs have essentially a semantical aspect, which has led many to wonder how such states can be accommodated by a natural science of the mind. A reductive account of meaning is supposed to contribute to a dissolution of such worries. This work is a critical examination of the very idea of a naturalized semantics and the assumptions which make it seem remotely plausible. Focusing mainly on the normativity of meaning--the fact that the meaning of a word, say, determines correct and incorrect use--I argue that attempts at naturalizing semantics in this way are fundamentally misguided. I then examine the consequences of this conclusion for the prospects of a scientific theory of the mind. I argue that there is no compelling reason to think that a naturalistic theory of the mind needs a reductive account of meaning, and I examine the prospects for an alternative approach to the issue of intentionality