How to understand consciousness: The strength of the phenomenological method

World Futures 65 (2):101 – 110 (2009)
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Abstract

Analyzing the outline of the endless literature on consciousness, the separation between science and philosophy rather than being overcome, seems to come back in different shapes. According to this point of view, the hard problem seems to be how to study consciousness while avoiding a slip back to the old dualism. This article outlines the advantages of the phenomenological method. This method, more than getting over the mind-body separation, anticipates it through an open gaze, able to bring back the human presence as something structurally “ambiguous.” Reintroducing Husserl's scientific project in a complete way, Francisco Varela opened up a research area yet to be explored, which promises to be fertile for neuroscience, provided that we accept that radicalism essential to phenomenology.

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Maria Armezzani
University of Padua

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References found in this work

What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1974 - Philosophical Review 83 (4):435-50.
What is it like to be a bat?Thomas Nagel - 1979 - In Mortal questions. New York: Cambridge University Press. pp. 435 - 450.
The Significance of Consciousness.Charles P. Siewert - 1998 - Princeton University Press.

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