Abstract

Here I will be proposing the basis for an epistemological view I want to call historical realism, inspired in Marx writings after 1845 and Rorty's neo-pragmatism. Although Peirce's views contain the first systematic criticism of traditional philosophy necessary for historical realism, in the process of visualizing the feasibility of this epistemological view Rorty's Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature is crucial. With respect to Rorty I will elaborate on his criticism of traditional philosophy but I will reject as unrealistic his proposal of turning philosophy into conversational philosophy where truth is not an issue anymore. On this respect I will argue that, as practical human beings, we cannot put a dividing line between our intra-contextual epistemic concerns and a meta-level conversation detached from those concerns. ;I will take Marx's own theses and oppose them to those of contemporary Marxists in order to show that current interpretations of "ideology" and "alienation" are misconceived. This is done to show that a new form of conceiving reality is needed, where these two notions don't play the essential role they play in contemporary Marxism. ;I will prove that knowledge consists and is justified in praxis, that there is no absolute truth in the traditional sense, that this conception of knowledge as historically conditioned requires a new notion of reality, that historical realism is a pluralistic epistemology, and that it is opposed to Lenin's naive sensualism and Althusser's scientificism