Justice is not equality

Ratio 21 (4):371-391 (2008)
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Abstract

This essay disputes G. A. Cohen's claim that John Rawls's argument for the difference principle involves an argument from moral arbitrariness to equality and then an illicit move away from equality. Moreover, the claim that an argument from moral arbitrariness establishes equality as the essential distributive justice ideal is found wanting.

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2009-01-28

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Richard J. Arneson
University of California, San Diego

Citations of this work

The Priority View Bites the Dust?Andrew Williams - 2012 - Utilitas 24 (3):315-331.
Choices Chance and Change: Luck Egalitarianism Over Time.Patrick Tomlin - 2013 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 16 (2):393-407.
Luck egalitarianism and what valuing responsibility requires.Alexandra Couto - 2018 - Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy 21 (2):193-217.
Ce este egalitarianismul?Eugen Huzum - 2012 - Transilvania:79-85.

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