Learning Through Simulation

Philosophers' Imprint 20 (2020)
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Abstract

Mental simulation — such as imagining tilting a glass to figure out the angle at which water would spill — can be a way of coming to know the answer to an internally or externally posed query. Is this form of learning a species of inference or a form of observation? We argue that it is neither: learning through simulation is a genuinely distinct form of learning. On our account, simulation can provide knowledge of the answer to a query even when the basis for that answer is opaque to the learner. Moreover, through repeated simulation, the learner can reduce this opacity, supporting self-training and the acquisition of more accurate models of the world. Simulation is thus an essential part of the story of how creatures like us become effective learners and knowers.

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Author Profiles

Sara Aronowitz
University of Toronto, St. George Campus
Tania Lombrozo
Princeton University

Citations of this work

How Imagination Informs.Joshua Myers - 2025 - Philosophical Quarterly 75 (1):167-189.
The epistemic imagination revisited.Arnon Levy & Ori Kinberg - 2023 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 107 (2):319-336.
Exploring by Believing.Sara Aronowitz - 2021 - Philosophical Review 130 (3):339-383.

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