Abstract

The question of political obligation seems to involve several interrelated issues. See Hanna Pitkin, "Obligation and Consent-I," American Political Science Review, LIX , p. 991. ;John Rawls, A Theory of Justice , p. 27. ; I propose, moreover, that the consent-utilitarian framework can, to a reasonable degree, account for the main positive features in the other major perspectives on political obligation . Such features include a respect for individuality, a respect for fundamental rights, and a concern for the common good. At the same time, this framework, I believe, avoids the main weaknesses of the other perspectives. Such weaknesses include the possibility of chaos, the possibility of tyrannical or irresponsible government, and a disregard for the well-being of others. Are there, then, any limits to the consent-utilitarian framework? That is, does this framework provide all the necessary and sufficient grounds for political obligation? This question is one of my concerns when finally I examine the issue of disobedience to the state. ;It is necessary to address certain major criticisms or questions that might be raised or have been raised against the two conditions proposed here. For example, is not the concept of 'consent of the governed' a fiction after all, especially when we have to consider modern states? Furthermore, how is political obligation to be determined with respect to dissenting and indifferent minorities, that is, those who have not given any consent? On the other hand, does utilitarianism not seem to run counter to our common moral intuitions regarding principles of justice and the intrinsic value of certain social rules? Should we not agree with John Rawls that "utilitarianism does not take seriously the distinction between persons"? ;We may reasonably assume that the citizen can achieve his full potential only within the state, that it is only within the state he is able to fulfil his highest aspirations. If we may assume, furthermore, that the citizen desires to fulfil his highest aspirations, which thus makes life within the state necessary, then it becomes an essential task of political philosophy to examine what the proper relationship between citizen and state should be. In other words, a central task of political philosophy is to search for and, hopefully, to discover those grounds which appear necessary and sufficient for political obligation. ;I propose that the conditions of consent and a utilitarian perspective provide generally adequate justification for political obligation. More specifically, I argue that only an actual consent by the citizen to the state can provide one of the grounds for political obligation, that a mere hypothetical consent falls short of providing this ground. Only an actual consent seems consistent with the view of ourselves as autonomous moral agents, freely choosing our fate. In this respect, I therefore consider as particularly significant the consent formulations developed by Hobbes and Rousseau. In addition, I argue that the acceptable state must seek ends which are most beneficial and valuable to its citizens, given the assumption that the citizens desire those ends which are beneficial and valuable to them. Hence, a utilitarian perspective becomes a basic condition for political obligation.