Abstract

A familiar form of alethic pluralism is built on the view that while there is a single concept of truth, there are multiple properties associated with it. A newer form of alethic pluralism develops the view that there are multiple concepts of truth. Importantly, this form of pluralism has been offered an empirical footing, notably in the work of Barnard and Ulatowski, Mizumoto, and Wyatt. My paper offers a critical appraisal of that project: while the appeal to empirical data is a welcome addition to the philosophy of truth, I doubt that it supports conceptual pluralism. First, I argue that there are severe challenges involved in the very formulation of conceptual pluralism about truth: it risks being an incoherent thesis. Once that problem is addressed, I review the empirical data that have been associated with the thesis, and argue that the evidence points not toward a plurality of truth concepts but rather a plurality of theories about truth.