Primitivism about Truth

In Michael Lynch, Jeremy Wyatt, Junyeol Kim & Nathan Kellen (eds.), The Nature of Truth (Second edition). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. pp. 525-538 (2021)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

This essay offers an account and defense of conceptual primitivism about truth: the view that the concept of truth is a fundamental concept that cannot be analyzed or defined in terms of concepts that are more fundamental. It considers three arguments in defense of primitivism, and meets a familiar objection that fundamental concepts are by their nature obscure and mysterious. It concludes by considering the ways in which primitivism is similar to and different from other theories of truth, both substantive and deflationary.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2020-07-29

Downloads
511 (#55,140)

6 months
136 (#36,325)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jamin Asay
Purdue University

References found in this work

Truth.Paul Horwich - 1990 - Oxford, GB: Clarendon Press. Edited by Frank Jackson & Michael Smith.
Truth and ontology.Trenton Merricks - 2007 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Conceptions of truth.Wolfgang Künne - 2003 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The thought: A logical inquiry.Gottlob Frege - 1956 - Mind 65 (259):289-311.
Truth.Paul Horwich - 2005 - In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook of Contemporary Philosophy. New York: Oxford University Press UK. pp. 261-272.

View all 17 references / Add more references