Abstract

Naturalism is an important kind of Ethical Reductionism. It holds that all evaluative properties can be reduced to natural properties; in plain language “they are natural properties”. Such an ontological doctrine has also an epistemological side to the effect that our ethical beliefs can be justified empirically, and through such a justification ethical knowledge is at the same footing as scientific knowledge. This essay is a fulfillment of a promise I made before. This essay concludes that explaining particular ethical beliefs as observations, drawing on the idea of “inferential chain,” is unsuccessful; for firstly it cannot explain how our belief in ethical properties as distinct from natural properties is justified in the first place and secondly it has the unacceptable implication that in scientific identities we know base properties through mere knowledge of supervenient properties. “ethical explanations of non-ethical facts” is also unable to accomplish empirical justification of ethical beliefs: although according to the naturalist it is possible to ascribe the explanatoriness of natural facts to ethical facts, this is of no epistemological benefit; in order to have epistemological benefit it has to explain an observable fact that the base natural hypothesis cannot explain. So ethical hypotheses do not contribute to explanation and it is impossible to justify them via explanatory inference.