Galileo and prior philosophy

Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 35 (1):115-136 (2004)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Galileo claimed inconsistency in the Aristotelian dogma concerning falling bodies and stated that all bodies must fall at the same rate. However, there is an empirical situation where the speeds of falling bodies are proportional to their weights; and even in vacuo all bodies do not fall at the same rate under terrestrial conditions. The reason for the deficiency of Galileo’s reasoning is analyzed, and various physical scenarios are described in which Aristotle’s claim is closer to the truth than is Galileo’s. The purpose is not to reinstate Aristotelian physics at the expense of Galileo and Newton, but rather to provide evidence in support of the verdict that empirical knowledge does not come from prior philosophy.Author Keywords: Author Keywords: Aristotle; Galileo; Thought experiments; Falling bodies.

Other Versions

No versions found

Links

PhilArchive

    This entry is not archived by us. If you are the author and have permission from the publisher, we recommend that you archive it. Many publishers automatically grant permission to authors to archive pre-prints. By uploading a copy of your work, you will enable us to better index it, making it easier to find.

    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 106,169

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Galileo vs Aristotle on free falling bodies.Markus Andreas Schrenk - 2004 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 7 (1):1-11.
Galileo versus Aristotle on Free Falling Bodies.Markus Schrenk - 2004 - History of Philosophy & Logical Analysis 7 (1):81-89.
Galileo's Falling Bodies.Liz Stillwaggon Swan - 2011 - In Michael Bruce & Steven Barbone, Just the Arguments. Chichester, West Sussex, U.K.: Wiley‐Blackwell. pp. 346–347.
Galileo and the Equations of Motion.Dino Boccaletti - 2016 - Cham: Imprint: Springer.
Two Ways of Imagining Galileo's Experiment.Margot Strohminger - 2021 - In Amy Kind & Christopher Badura, Epistemic Uses of Imagination. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 202-217.
Galileo and the indispensability of scientific thought experiment.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):397-424.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
96 (#234,581)

6 months
9 (#445,453)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jeanne Peijnenburg
University of Groningen

Citations of this work

How can computer simulations produce new knowledge?Claus Beisbart - 2012 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 2 (3):395-434.
When are thought experiments poor ones?Jeanne Peijnenburg & David Atkinson - 2003 - Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 34 (2):305-322.

View all 15 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Are Thought Experiments Just What You Thought?John D. Norton - 1996 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 26 (3):333 - 366.
Galileo and the indispensability of scientific thought experiment.Tamar Szabó Gendler - 1998 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 49 (3):397-424.
The evidential significance of thought experiment in science.James W. McAllister - 1996 - Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 27 (2):233-250.
The Science of Mechanics. [REVIEW]Ernst Mach - 1903 - Ancient Philosophy (Misc) 13:317.
Thought experiments. [REVIEW]James Robert Brown & Yiftach J. H. Fehige - 1995 - Canadian Journal of Philosophy 25 (1):135-142.

Add more references