This Proposition is Not True: C.S. Peirce and the Liar Paradox

Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 47 (4):421 (2011)
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Abstract

Charles Sanders Peirce proposed two different solutions to the Liar Paradox. He proposed the first in 1865 and the second in 1869. However, no one has yet noted in the literature that Peirce rejected his 1869 solution in 1903. Peirce never explicitly proposed a third solution to the Liar Paradox. Nonetheless, I shall argue he developed the resources for a third and novel solution to the Liar Paradox.In what follows, I will first explain the Liar Paradox. Second, I will briefly rehearse Peirce's 1865 solution and his reasons for rejecting it.1 Third, I will review his 1869 solution and his reasons for rejecting it in 1903. Lastly, I will propose a novel solution to the Liar Paradox by drawing upon Peirce's later..

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Citations of this work

Rascals, Triflers, and Pragmatists: Developing a Peircean Account of Assertion.Kenneth Boyd & Diana Heney - 2017 - British Journal for the History of Philosophy 25 (2):1-22.
Peirce on Truth as the Predestinate Opinion.Richard Kenneth Atkins - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):411-429.
Peirce's Account of Assertion.Jaime Alfaro Iglesias - 2016 - Dissertation, University of São Paulo

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References found in this work

Warrant for nothing (and foundations for free)?Crispin Wright - 2004 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 78 (1):167–212.
Peirce's paradoxical solution to the Liar's Paradox.Emily Michael - 1975 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 16 (3):369-374.

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