Abstract

Feminists critique nearly every feature of the social contract and its legitimation of liberal theory: its conception of persons is excessively individualistic; women are not considered free and equal; women are not considered rational or capable of consent; obligations are misconstrued as voluntary; and the public/private distinction unfairly ghettoizes women. Despite this critique, I reject that liberal theory is necessarily patriarchal; while the social contract has historically legitimized women's subjugation, liberalism is not essentially deleterious to women's interests. ;The feminist complaint against liberalism is better considered a problem of the 'good'; this 'good' in turn is best conceptualized in terms of an ideal of moral personality. It is liberal practice--and not liberal theory--that is inimical to this conception of moral personality traditionally associated with women. Carol Gilligan's research is a politically valuable expression of this alternative conception of moral personality because it incorporates women's self-understanding, while not incidentally paralleling feminist political critiques. ;For current liberal theory, a kantian conception of moral personality is central to John Rawls' political philosophy. Following Doppelt's interpretation of Rawls, I argue that Rawls' model construction of moral personality also incorporates a conception of the good--a 'meta-value'. However there are compelling reasons to prefer this liberal/kantian model construct as most appropriate. I also defend Rawls against feminist claims that the family is properly an institution subject to the claims of justice and that persons within the original position would choose to eliminate gender. ;Must a rawlsian liberalism built upon a kantian conception of moral personality necessarily be hostile to a 'care' conception? No, because the conceptions are not deeply incompatible; I nevertheless propose an expanded conception of moral personality. I leave the normative impact of this expanded conception for a theory of justice unexplored, but suggest that it will parallel ongoing work in feminist legal theory and ethics. I conclude that liberalism is not necessary inimical to women's interests; in practice, it is possible to be a self-in-relation in a liberal state, precisely through self-consciousness