An ‘Inexact’ Philosophy of Economics?

Economics and Philosophy 13 (1):25-37 (1997)
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Abstract

The Inexact and Separate Science of Economics represents the most ambitious attempt to provide a systematic account of economic methodology since the first edition of Blaug's The Methodology of Economics. As such, it has been the subject of extensive critical commentary. For all the attention it has received, however, some important aspects of the book's thesis have not been developed properly. Two important ones are what might be called, following the terminology used in the experimental economics literature, the ‘framing effect’ of Hausman's definition of economics, and the significance of Hausman's claim that economists are committed to developing economics as a ‘separate’ science. To understand these points it is important to make explicit the position from which Hausman approaches the philosophy of science.

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Roger E. Backhouse
Erasmus University Rotterdam

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The Methodology of Economics.M. Blaug - 1983 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 34 (3):289-295.
What Use Is Empirical Confirmation?David Miller - 1996 - Economics and Philosophy 12 (2):197.
Rerum Cognoscere Causas.Frank Hahn - 1996 - Economics and Philosophy 12 (2):183.

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