Reflexivity and Sentiment in Hume’s Philosophy

In Paul Russell (ed.), The Oxford Handbook of David Hume. Oxford: Oxford University Press (2016)
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Abstract

This contribution is concerned with what Hume means by reflection and sentiment. Hume’s Treatise is devoted to an account of the extent to which the mind is able to bear its own reflexion or turn mental states on themselves. This theme is likely the “new scene of thought” that inspired Hume’s major concerns in the Treatise. Although Hume found that the understanding fails to understand itself, the passions do better in satisfying curiosity about curiosity, and, most importantly, moral sentiment is able to approve of itself. The author contends that the whole task of the moral sentiment is to get us to fulfill our part to mankind and society, and that, according to Hume, the sentiments are the noble source of morality itself.

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2016-10-24

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Annette Claire Baier
Last affiliation: University of Otago

Citations of this work

Reading Hume on the passions.Gabriel Watts - 2021 - Belgrade Philosophical Annual 1 (34):73-94.

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