Just What Do We Have In Mind?

In Felicia Ackerman (ed.), Midwest Studies in Philosophy. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. pp. 25-48 (1981)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

M any philosophers who otherwise have disparate views on the mind share a fundamental assumption. The assumption is that mental processes, or at least those that explain behavior, are wholly determined by properties of the individual whose processes they are.' As elaborated by..

Other Versions

reprint Baker, Lynne Rudder (1985) "Just what do we have in mind?". Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10(1):25-48
reprint Baker, Lynne Rudder (1986) "Just What Do We Have In Mind?". Midwest Studies in Philosophy 10(1):25-48

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 100,752

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-12-22

Downloads
100 (#210,644)

6 months
7 (#698,214)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Lynne Rudder Baker
PhD: Vanderbilt University; Last affiliation: University of Massachusetts, Amherst

Citations of this work

Methodological solipsism and explanation in psychology.Raimo Tuomela - 1989 - Philosophy of Science 56 (March):23-47.
Burgeoning skepticism.Willem A. deVries - 1990 - Erkenntnis 33 (2):141-164.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references