The Historical-philosophical Horizon and the Forming of the Notion of Nature in Schelling’s The Essay on Freedom

Filozofska Istrazivanja 40 (1):79-90 (2020)
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Abstract

The Essay on Freedom represents a milestone in the philosophy of F. W. J. Schelling. Although Schelling already deviated from a strictly idealistic framework with his philosophy of nature, notably from that of Kant and Fichte, because he was seeking a moment of self-positing activity of the absolute subject in the object itself, it was only with The Essay on Freedom that he stepped out of that framework. The central point considered is an introduction of the second principle that was complementary, but irreducible to the standard idealist principle of self consciousness. It was about the ground or nature in God. Only through that duality of principles, it was possible to grasp the positive notion of freedom as the possibility for good and evil. In such manner comprehended, the fact of human freedom in its entirety became relation with the whole of beings. The purpose of such explanation was an attempt to solve the problem that was spanning through Schellingʼs entire philosophy – the problem of the relation between finite and infinite.

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