Bare Bones Moral Realism and the Objections from Relativism

In Steven D. Hales (ed.), A Companion to Relativism. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell. pp. 368–390 (2010)
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Abstract

This chapter contains sections titled: Abstract Introduction Three Objections From Relativism Bare Bones Moral Realism References.

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bare bones moral realism and the objections from relativism   defends moral realism against three objections from relativism   Moral realism can be defined (somewhat roughly) as the view that there are (objective) moral facts   e.g., realists maintain that some actions are wrong   Moral relativism is a bit harder to define because the term is used in several different ways   The (first) Horgan – Timmons objection from intercultural relativism   the (first) Horgan – Timmons objection that can be raised against any version of realism   second Horgan – Timmons argument (see their 1996: 15 – 17) starts out just like the first – by claiming that moral realism entails that certain kinds of disputes between us and certain kinds of Twin Earthlings would be non ‐ genuine   novel version of moral realism – view that commits to EH and essentially nothing else – or nothing else that, in the present context, is controversial – bare bones moral realism   sorts of naturalistic facts that, according to EH, are

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9781444392494   9781405190213

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10.1002/9781444392494.ch19

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Mark Balaguer
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Indeterminacy and Normativity.Giulia Pravato - 2022 - Erkenntnis 87 (5):2119-2141.

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