Abstract

Hume's theory of human understanding is frequently characterized as showing how imagination is determined by experience, where experience is reduced to the relation between a spectator and sensible objects. But a survey of Hume's work as a whole shows that he depends on a much richer concept of experience, one that reaches beyond the relation between object and spectator to include the network of relations between a spectator and her community, and between an individual's perceptions and her personal interests and passions. ;In the first four chapters I concentrate on Book I of the Treatise in establishing two views of imagination--one based on an experiential model illustrated by the mechanical metaphor, and the other on an educational model illustrated by the metaphor of the republic or commonwealth. In Chapter 5 I describe the way in which Hume thinks scepticism permits us to attain the self-knowledge that enables us to live as moral beings responsible for our beliefs. In Chapter 6 I turn to Hume's essays on taste to describe the creative role imagination must play if we are to give the "due attention" required of an impartial spectator. In the final chapter I return to the relation between society and imagination to describe how we learn from the testimony of others. ;Hume does not offer a hierarchical or dualistic account of human nature. He thinks we must engage in "well-mixed" lives in which neither reasoning nor acting draw too much. The pull of these extremes is tempered by on-going participation in "polite conversation" with our community, which grounds our ideas in common sense, refines our thoughts, and extends our experience and humanity. It makes a great deal of difference which events in an individual or corporate life are invested with causal significance, and which are perceived as paradigms of moral praise or blame. And that for this reason, I conclude that our moral responsibility extends to the nature of the stories we tell about ourselves and each other