Simpson's Paradox and Causality

American Philosophical Quarterly 52 (1):13-25 (2015)
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Abstract

There are three questions associated with Simpson’s Paradox (SP): (i) Why is SP paradoxical? (ii) What conditions generate SP?, and (iii) What should be done about SP? By developing a logic-based account of SP, it is argued that (i) and (ii) must be divorced from (iii). This account shows that (i) and (ii) have nothing to do with causality, which plays a role only in addressing (iii). A counterexample is also presented against the causal account. Finally, the causal and logic-based approaches are compared by means of an experiment to show that SP is not basically causal.

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Don Dcruz
Indian Institute of Technology, Delhi

Citations of this work

Simpson’s paradox beyond confounding.Zili Dong, Weixin Cai & Shimin Zhao - 2024 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 14 (3):1-22.
Mereological Dominance and Simpson’s Paradox.Tung-Ying Wu - 2020 - Philosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israel 48 (1):391–404.

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References found in this work

Thinking, Fast and Slow.Daniel Kahneman - 2011 - New York: New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.
Causality: Models, Reasoning and Inference.Judea Pearl - 2000 - New York: Cambridge University Press.

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