Abstract

The longtermist argument that the long-term future is much more valuable than the near-term future may fail on the grounds that we may be living in a Malignant World. Assuming that it is possible for civilizations to have the equivalent of a malignant mutation, and that this mutation then could spread tumescently through spacetime, two conclusions follow. First, assuming malignancy, because risk of catastrophic mutation scales with the number of sites of possible mutation, there may be no civilizational benefit to indefinite expansion, besides perhaps redundancy, meaning total welfarist projections should not assume astronomical expansion into the future. Second, assuming malignancy, the total welfarist should both prioritize reducing the probabilities of mutations and also discount the future according to aggressive exponential growth of risk. Hypothesizing a Malignant World is shown to be consistent with scientific observation and theoretically parsimonious in several respects. It also has the added benefits of giving indirect accounts of both the Repugnant Conclusion and the Fermi Paradox.