Conjeturas semánticas: justificar sin confrontar

Análisis Filosófico 18 (2):151-157 (1999)
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Abstract

In this paper I criticize Comesaña's point of view on Putnam's model-theoretic argument. I claim that there is an interesting point made by the argument that Comesaña has not taken into account: if we want our semantic assertions to be at ali justified, the externalist claim according to which justification requires the God 's Eye View has to be given up.

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Eduardo Alejandro Barrio
Universidad de Buenos Aires (UBA)

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