Embree and Cairns on Phenomenology and Psychology

Schutzian Research 9:91-109 (2017)
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Abstract

This article compares and contrasts Dorion Cairn’s treatment of the relationship between phenomenology and psychology with Embree’s handling of that same topic. Embree, who to a great degree aligns with Schutz, and Cairns converge on the treatment of behaviorism. However, fundamental differences appear in their contrasting approaches to psychology, with Cairns seeking to uphold the distinctiveness of philosophy/phenomenology over against psychology and Embree/Schutz inclining toward a more collaborative engagement with psychology. Their differences reflect their preference for transcendental philosophy or phenomenological psychology, both of which possible preferences were clearly recognized by Edmund Husserl in his “Nachwort zu meinen Ideen.” These preferences in turn have to do with the ultimate philosophical purposes each author is pursuing.

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reprint Barber, Michael (2021) "Embree and Cairns on Phenomenology and Psychology". Investigaciones Fenomenológicas 7():129

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