Intentional Relations and Divergent Perspectives in Social Understanding

Abstract

selves than we care about others, so we are more likely to attend to and interpret our own activities than we are likely to attend to and interpret the activities of others. Yet, it is also a common notion that a person has the least knowledge of his or her own biases or prejudices, and that it is often a naive observer, who can better interpret the meaning of someone's actions when such biases are involved.

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Citations of this work

Extending self-consciousness into the future.John Barresi - 2001 - In Chris Moore & Karen Lemmon (eds.), The Self in Time: Developmental Perspectives. Erlbaum. pp. 141-161.
Consciousness and intentionality.John Barresi - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (1-2):77-93.

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References found in this work

Does the chimpanzee have a theory of mind?David Premack & Guy Woodruff - 1978 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 1 (4):515-526.
Chimpanzees: Self-recognition.G. Gallup - 1970 - Science 167:86-87.
Intentional relations and social understanding.John Barresi & Chris Moore - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (1):107-122.

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